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Foreword 
Five years ago, when the United States was celebrating its bicen-
tennial, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration marked 
the occasion by-among other things-publishing a short narrative 
that summarized the role of NASA and its predecessor organiza-
tion, the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics , in the 
development of aeronautics and space exploration. 
Now it seems fitting to update that volume. With the first flight 
of the Space Shuttle a few months hence, we will cross a major 
threshold in the space program. In its operational lifetime, which 
will span the 1980s, the Shuttle will introduce revolutionary changes : 
routine access to the space environment for experimenters as well as 
for spacecraft and sensors; a minimum-g flight profile, notably 
reducing stress during launch and ascent and thereby reducing the 
special preparation formerly required for both people and hard-
ware; and the potential for servicing expensive payloads in orbit or 
retrieving them for overhaul on the ground. 
More subtle, and yet perhaps more important in the long run, 
are the changes in attitude that will accompany the new freedom of 
access to the space environment. Our present concept of space is 
forbidding: machines and humans are surrounded by hostile con-
ditions that constantly threaten catastrophe, limiting many space 
activities to brief, one-shot excursions. The Space Transportation 
System will alter this concept through the confidence that comes 
from repetition and familiarity. Consider, for example, our altered 
concept of the moon. Before the Apollo landings , the moon was for 
us much the same image that humans had shared since antiquity-a 
remote, cold, somewhat romantic body. Our intellect told us it was 
intimately linked with the earth, but our emotions felt it was distant 
and unattainable. The first "giant step for mankind" was in the 
category of exciting derring-do. We were proud of the achievement; 
humans had done what they had never been able to do before. But it 
was the landings that followed, with extensive televised explorations 
of the lunar surface, that made the moon a familiar place, there for us 
to return to whenever we wished. 
Such a familiarity with the space environment is what the Space 
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Transportation System will confer upon the human race. Frequent, 
routine flights; crews performing normal jobs in security and com-
fort; flight vehicles that are refueled, reloaded, and flown again many 
times-all these are comfortable analogs to transportation modes 
and operations that we are familiar with in our daily lives. 
Access and familiarity will make space useful in much the ame 
way that Conestoga wagons and the railroads made possible the 
mass settlement of the American continent, and as transport aircraft 
in only a few years made mass air travel a fact of everyday life. 
Reliable transportation negates or minimizes the liabilities of the 
environment; having done this, it opens up the way for use of the 
unique aspects of that environment. 
Which brings us to the third, or serendipity, level of change that 
the Space Transportation System will generate. Once the system is in 
operation, I have confidence that uses will materialize that were 
never seriously considered-perhaps not even envisioned-by the 
planners and designers. These may be the real building blocks of 
progress. 
Because this sequence of radical changes is in the offing, it is well 
to pause at the threshold and reflect on what went before and how we 
carne to be at this juncture. 
November 1980 Robert A. Frosch 
Administrator 
Preface 
For some years the NASA History Office was embarrassed by a 
thin but steady stream of requests for copies of a brief history of 
NASA. Again and again we had to say that none existed. There had 
been one once, back in 1965, when Eugene M. Emme, NASA his-
torian, wrote a Historical Sketch of NASA (EP-29). But it had been 
out of print for several years and by now was outdated enough to dis-
courage a reprint. The project of a new short history kept nagging at 
our collective conscience, but we were busy with other things. It was 
not hard to convince ourselves that we just couldn't stretch our staff 
resources that much. 
Then in 1974 that persuasive imperative, necessity, tookahand. 
The American Public Works Association, armed with the blessing of 
a joint congressional re olution, was preparing a bicentennial 
volume of the history of 200 year of public works in the United 
States. Association officers asked NASA Administrator James C. 
Fletcher to have a chapter prepared on the aeronautics and space 
programs. Dr. Fletcher agreed; the project was assigned to our office. 
So now it would be done; the only question was whether someone in 
the office would do it or whether we would contract for a manu-
script. Mindful of our long-felt need for a similar manuscript, I 
volunteered. The bicentennial volume got its chapter and here, 
revised and somewhat enlarged, is the NASA version. Now, since the 
first two printings seem to have found a rather diverse audience and 
our stock of copies has been exhausted, it seems useful to bring it up 
to date . 
Because of the purpose for which it was originally written, it 
contains no reference notes and only a generalized bibliography. So 
I cannot blame the sources for errors or deficiencies; they are of my 
own cobbling. 
October 1980 F.W.A. 
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Rise of Aeronautics 
In 1913 the clouds of war were gathering over Europe and cast-
ing their shadows on America. The European powers were racing to 
arm themselves against each other, not only with conventional land 
and sea armaments, but also with the new weapon of the 20th cen-
tury, the airplane. In their race they overcame the U.S. lead estab-
lished by the Wright brothers and left this country in a technological 
backwash. Particularly disturbing to American observers was our 
primitive and unorganized aeronautical establishment-a frail 
shadow of the research facilities and government-subsidized indus-
tries arising in Europe. 
Most active among the small group of concerned men in the 
United States was the secretary of the Smithsonian Institution, 
Charles D. Walcott. Convinced that the situation called for federal 
sponsorship of an aviation organization, he worked hard selling the 
idea both inside and outside the government. After several false 
starts, he succeeded. On 3 March 1915, President Woodrow Wilson 
signed into law a Navy appropriations bill with a rider establishing an 
independent Advisory Committee for Aeronautics. The munificent 
sum of $5000 was appropriated for the committee's first year's 
operations . 
The new committee was unique in organizational structure, 
though in years to come it was to serve as a model for several others. 
Twelve presidentially appointed members, serving without pay, 
drawn from the military and scientific sides of government and from 
the scientific community at large, were charged "to supervise and 
direct the scientific study of the problems offlight, with a view to their 
practical solution" and to "direct and conduct research and experi-
ments in aeronautics ." 
First among the tasks of the committee was to find the dimen-
sions of the problem. The members set out to survey the state of 
aeronautics in the United States. If their purpose had been to justifY 
their existence, they would have found the results amply rewarding. 
Aviation was generally regarded as a daredevil sport practiced by a 
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handful of wealthy young men. Aeronautical research was virtually 
nonexistent. Only two American universities offered courses in 
aeronautical engineering. Research facilities such as wind tunnels 
were pitifully few in number and unsystematized in use. The 
aviation "industry" was a scattered collection of small handicraft 
shops. The military services had bought only a few dozen airplanes 
in the brief history of aviation, and nearly all of them were fatally 
obsolete by current European standards. And finally, none of the 
work in aeronautics within the government (located in the Weather 
Bureau, the Bureau of Standards, and the military services) and in the 
civil sector was coordinated. Clearly a federal laboratory for aero-
nautical research was urgently needed. 
Army, Navy, and the committee considered establishing ajoint 
research center. Since the War Department had funds for acquiring 
real estate, it bought a tract ofland on the Back River near Hampton, 
Virginia. The intent was to colocate the aeronautical research facili-
ties of the two military services and the committee. Realities of war 
intervened, however; the War Department left its research at 
McCook Field in Dayton, Ohio (later Wright Field, now Wright-
Patterson Air Force Base); the Navy located its facility in Norfolk, 
Virginia. The National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics -
already acronymed NACA-went ahead with construction. Even so 
it was too late for the laboratory to assist the war effort. Not until 
11 June 1920 was the three-building complex-one of them a wind 
tunnel with a 1.5-meter test section-formally dedicated as the 
Langley Memorial Aeronautical Laboratory (named for Samuel P. 
Langley, aeronautical pioneer). 
FROM WAR TO WAR 
During the 1920s the new laboratory took form and substance. 
The needed theoretical base for scientific study of aeronautics was 
imported from Europe, and NACA staffed the laboratory slowly and 
carefully. A conscious decision was made to concentrate on the syste-
matic study of aerodynamics - the interactions between the three-
dimensional airspace and the shape and characteristics of a body 
moving through it-as the most needed of the many areas of 
research in aeronautics. Additional research facilities were built, 
carefully tailored to that purpose. Most of the credit for this hard 
focus and foresight should go to two dedicated members of the 
committee, Joseph S. Ames of Johns Hopkins University and 
Jerome C. Hunsaker of the Navy's Bureau of Aeronautics. 
~~~-- --- - ---~-------
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By the end of the decade the fledgling NACA had achieved 
impressive results , recognized at home and abroad . In 1929 a dis-
tinguished British engineer declared: "The only people so far who 
have been able to get at something like accurate results from wind 
tunnel experiments are the workers at the experimental station at 
Langley Field ." In the same year a British engineering journal went 
further: 
They [th e Langley group] were rhe firsr ro esrablish , and indeed ro visualize, a 
variable-densi ry runn el; they have led again with rhe con [rucri on of the 
twenty-foot propeller research tunnel; and sreps are now being raken ro pro-
vide a " fu ll -scal e" runnel in which complete aeroplane up to Lhirty- llve-foor 
span can be tesred. The present-day American position in al l branche of aero-
nautical kn owledge can , without doubr, be attributed mainly LO thi s far-seeing 
policy and expenditure o n up-ro-date labo rarory equipment. 
Among the m ost important results of Langley's aerodynamic 
research with the new facilities were: the NACA cowling (1928), 
whose streamlined shape increased aircraft speed ; systematic studies 
of aerodynamic drag which put firm numbers on the penal ties to 
performance from such design practices as locating engine nacelles 
apart from the wings or fuselage instead of merging them into the 
Langley Laboratory's first wind tunnel, finished in 1920. 
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structure (1930); and the penalties of using fixed, exposed landing 
gear instead of retracting the wheels into the structure (1929). 
In Washington the 1920s saw the main committee and its tech-
nical subcommittees become established as the most knowledgeable 
source of advice on aeronautics in the country and the clearing-
house for exchange of information. Much of this sure rise to ascend-
ency in U.S. aeronautical research derived from the selection of 
George W. Lewis, professor of mechanical engineering at Swarth-
more College, as director of aeronautical research .Joining NACA in 
1919, Dr. Lewis for the next 26 years planned the research program, 
apportioned the money, and hired and trained the people in 
NACA. 
The great depression that swept the United States in 1929 
proved a boon to NACA in at least two senses. First, additional 
research facilities could be constructed at low depression prices 
(mostly with pump-priming money from the Public Works Adminis-
tration); second, government salaries and the up-to-date research 
facilities suddenly were very attractive to promising young engi-
neers. Thus, in 193 1, the 9- by I8-meter " full scale" wind tunnel , 
then the largest in the world, was completed at a cost of$900 000; the 
The Jull-scale wind tunnel at Langley, completed in 1931. 
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61 O-meter-Iong towing tunnel was also finish ed that year. More wind 
tunnels were added in the mid-30s, and from a total staff of 181 
people in 1930, NACA grew to 523 by 1939. Painstakingly and sys-
tematically the researchers charted out the family of NACA wing 
shapes that would shortly lift military and civil aircraft allover the 
world. As aircraft speeds rose, new aerodynamic problems had to be 
solved. Stalls and sp ins, treacherous problems that had caused a 
fourth of all aircraft accidents, were explored, understood, and 
largely countered. 
By 1936 NACA officials became aware of two interconnected 
problems looming on the horizon: (1) European nations were again 
rapidly building new research facilities; (2) room for growth was 
limited at Langley. Once more American leadership in aeronautics 
was challenged to expand its research base . As more evidence came 
in, the concern became alarm. In 1938, a special committee on 
expanded facilities was form ed, and it recommended the immediate 
creation of a second aeronautical research center, this one in Cali-
fornia. The new laboratory was authorized by Congress in 1939 . Less 
than a month later, on 14 September, ground was broken at Moffett 
Field, aN avy airfield 64 kilometers south of San Francisco, for what 
Part of the extensive facilities of the Langley Research Center, 196 7. 
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would become the Ames Aeronautical Laboratory (named after 
Joseph S. Ames, president of Johns Hopkins University, charter 
member and from 1927 to 1939 the dedicated chairman ofNACA). 
The most impressive physical structure was the huge 12- by 24-meter 
wind tunnel, which dwarfed its parent "full-scale" tunnel at Langley. 
Also a beginning was made on an impressive array of high-speed 
research facilities. 
But this was not enough; the war had begun in Europe on 1 Sep-
tember. On 19 October 1939, a second special committee, this one 
headed by Charles A. Lindbergh who had annually surveyed 
European aviation progress for the Army Air Corps, urgently rec-
ommended the building of a third laboratory, this one to specialize 
in research on aircraft power plants. InJune 1940 Congress agreed. 
A site was made available at the Cleveland municipal airport, and 
construction began on facilities to develop and test aircraft piston 
engines and their components, study fuels and combustion, and 
perform research in fundamental physics, chemistry, and metal-
lurgy of power plants. In 1943 research would belatedly begin on jet 
Ames Research Center, 1970. The big 12- by 24-meter wind tunnel is Iwused in the 
large building on the left. 
_J 
A HISTORY OF ACA AND NASA, 191 5- 1980 7 
engines . After Dr. Lewis's death in 1948, the new facility was named 
the Lewis Flight Propulsion Laboratory. Wartime expansion came to 
Langley too; the War Department bought more acreage and NACA 
expanded into a west area with additional facilities that doubled the 
research capabili ty. 
World War II dramatically changed NACA-and aviation. For 
NACA it meant a shift in both the nature and the size of its work-
load. For aviation it meant a surge in speed and altitude of combat 
aircraft. NACA turned its attention to the short-term urgencies of 
finding practical fixes for problems in military aircraft already in 
production or on the drawing boards. The rapid increase in 
performance and the punishing demands of combat flying had also 
generated or exaggerated a host of aerodynamic and structural 
problems. The workload was overwhelmi ng. From 1941 through 
1944 the NACA laboratories worked on 115 different airplane types. 
But results were quietly spectacular; fighter aircraft speeds and 
altitudes were increased, buffeting and stalls were cured, the tail 
design of the B-29 was saved from a dangerous weakness. The 
Lewis Research Center, 1963. The laboratory is on the near side of the Cleveland 
Airport. 
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number of NACA personnel rose 13-fold from the 1939 figure, to 
6800, and cadres from the Langley mother laboratory served as the 
administrative and research cores at the two new laboratories. 
In the midst of expanding from one to three laboratories, 
NACA's work was effective. "The Navy's famous fighters-the 
Corsair, Wildcat, and Hellcat- are possible only because they were 
based on fundamentals developed by the NACA," Secretary of the 
Navy Frank Knox volunteered in 1943. "All of them use NACA wing 
sections, NACA cooling methods, NACA high-lift devices. The great 
sea victories that have broken Japan 's expanding grip in the Pacific 
would not have been possible without the contributions of the 
NACA." 
NEW HORIZONS 
To the scientific community, the most exciting legacy of World 
War II was a glittering array of new technologies spawned by the 
massive war effort. Atomic energy, radar, antibiotics, the large 
rocket, radio telemetry, the computer, and the jet engine were war 
babies, lustily crying for expanded roles in the postwar world. The 
atomic age, the jet age, and the space age were at hand. They would 
shape the world's destiny in the next three decades and heavily 
influence the rest of the century. 
The world's political order had been drastically altered by the 
war. Much of Europe and Asia was in ashes. Old empires had 
crumbled; national economies were tottering perilously. Astride 
opposite sides of the world, towering like colossi, stood the United 
States and the Soviet Union, newly made into superpowers . It soon 
became apparent that they would test each other's mettle many times 
before a balance of power stabilized. And each nation moved quickly 
to exploit the new technologies. 
The atomic bomb was the most obvious and most immediately 
threatening technological change from World War II. Both super-
powers sought the best strategic systems that could deliver the bomb 
across the intercontinental dista.n:ces that separated them. J et-
powered bombers were an obvious extension of the wartime B-17 
and B-29, and both nations began designing and building them. The 
intercontinental rocket held great theoretical promise, but seemed 
much further down the technological road. Atomic bombs were 
bulky and heavy; a rocket to lift such a payload would be enormous 
in size and expense. The Soviet Union doggedly went ahead with 
attempts to build such rockets. The American military temporari ly 
I 
I 
I 
L_ 
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settled upon jet aircraft and smaller research and battlefield rockets. 
The Army imported Wernher von Braun and the German engineers 
who had created the wartime V-I and V-2 rockets and set them to 
overseeing the refurbishing and launching ofV-2s at White Sands, 
New Mexico. With its contractor theJet Propulsion Laboratory, the 
Army developed a series of battlefield missiles known as Corporal, 
Sergeant, and Redstone. The Navy designed and built the Viking 
research rockets. The freshly independent Air Force started a family 
of cruise missiles, from the jet Bomarc and Matador battlefield mis-
siles to Snark and the ambitious rocket-propelled Navaho, which 
were intended as intercontinental weapons . 
By 1951 progress on a thermonuclear bomb revived interest in 
the long-range ballistic missile. Two months before President 
Truman announced that the United States would develop the ther-
monuclear bomb, the Air Force contracted with Consolidated 
Vultee Aircraft Corporation (later Convair) to resume study, and 
then to develop, the Atlas intercontinental ballistic missile, a project 
that had been dormant for four years. During the next four years 
three intermediate range missiles, the Army's Jupiter, the Navy's 
Polaris , and the Air Force's Thor, and asecond generation ICBM, the 
Air Force's Titan, had been added to the list of American rocket 
projects. All were accorded top national priority. Fiscal 1953 saw the 
Department of Defense for the first time spend more than $1 million 
on missile research, development, and procurement. Fiscal 1957 saw 
the amount go over the $1 billion mark. 
The new postwar technologies were also having a dramatic 
effect on NACA. The swift rise of aircraft speeds and altitudes during 
the war had consumed the technological data base that NACA had so 
laboriously created in the 1930s. And now the jet engine, still in its 
infancy, portended another big surge in aircraft speed. Ahead lay the 
mysteries of the sound barrier, where strange things happened to 
fighter planes. Planes had crashed, men had died; by 1945 the need 
for information was urgent. In that year study began on a series of 
new wind tunnels; after many ups and downs the Unitary Plan was 
passed by Congress in 1949. It allotted $75 million to NACA for new 
wind tunnels and started a wind-tunnel center (Arnold Engineering 
Development Center) for the Air Force. 
But aerodynamic research faced serious physical obstacles. The 
wind tunnel, NACA's principal tool for aerodynamic research, 
yielded accurate data for subsonic and supersonic speeds but at 
transonic speeds (mach 0.9 to 1.1 ) suffered a "choking" effect that 
garbled the data. Until this problem was remedied-if it could be 
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remedied-other means had to be devised. In 1943 NACA took 
steps to meet the challenge. 
The short-term effort involved carrying test models to high 
altitudes in aircraft and dropping them, gathering flight data during 
their ballistic fall. This was only partially successful, since radar and 
telemetry were too primitive to return sophisticated data. Also, the 
objects seldom exceeded mach 1. The next step in this direction was 
to use rockets as motive power to launch models to transonic and 
supersonic speeds. Langley acquired a surplus naval station on 
Wallops Island, Virginia, for this purpose. It was called the Pilotless 
Aircraft Research Division. Later it became the Wallops Flight 
Center. 
The long-term measure was to plan and operate, in concert with 
the Air Corps and the Navy, the first of what was to become a highly 
successful series of special research aircraft. NACA's High-Speed 
Flight Research Station was established at Edwards, California, on 
Muroc Dry Lake. On 14 October 1947, Air Force Capt. Charles E. 
Yeager flew the X-I aircraft faster than the speed of sound. The 
dreaded barrier was breached. On 20 November 1953, NACA's 
Scott Crossfield in the 0-558-2 reached mach 2. The X-IA, the X-2, 
the X-15-faster and higher they flew , peaking at mach 6 (7272 
"Little missile row" at Wallops Flight Center, Virginia. Sounding rockets and small 
satellites are launched here. 
Flight Research Center, 1967. At upper left is seen the edge of Muroc Dry Lake, whose 
rock-hard flat suiface serves as the flight-test runway. In 1976 the center was renamed 
the Dryden FLight Research Center. 
The X - J, first aircraflto fly Jaster than the speed of sound in level flight. 
The X -15, which crowned the achievements of the research aircraft program with speeds 
over 7200 kilometers per /wur and altitudes above 108 000 meters. 
kilometers per hour) in speed and 108000 meters in altitude. Over a 
span of 22 years and more than 700 flights, the specially built 
research aircraft perilously, meticulously filled in the flight envelope 
for tran onic and supersonic flight and provided the design data for 
generations of post-World War II military aircraft. 
Meanwhile researchers at Langley had worked away at the 
intransigent transonic wind tunnel and by late 1950 John Stack and 
his team had come up with the answer-the "slotted throat," which 
eliminated the choking at dr near the speed of sound and made the 
transonic tunnel an effective research tool. Within a year it had 
proved its worth; Richard Whitcomb discovered the "area rule," a 
subtle balancing of the volume of fuselage and wings which pro-
duced the minimum-drag aircraft at transonic speeds. Quickly 
applied to military fighters already in design and construction, it 
enabled them to be the first fighters to break the sound barrier in 
level flight. 
By the mid-1950s NACA had modern research facilities that 
had cost a total of $300 million, a staff totaling 7200. With each 
passing year it was enlarging its missile research in proportion to the 
old mission of aerodynamic research. Major NACA contributions to 
the military missile programs came in 1955-1957. Materials research 
led by Robert R. Cilruth at Langley confirmed ablation as a means of 
controlling the intense heat generated by warheads and other bodies 
reentering the earth's atmosphere; H. Julian Allen at Ames demon-
strated the blunt-body shape as the most effective design for reen-
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tering bodies; and Alfred J. Eggers at Ames did significant work on 
the m chanics of balli tic reentry. 
The mid-1950s saw America's infant space program burgeon-
ing with promise and projects. As part of the U.S. participation in the 
forthcoming International Ceophy ical Year, it was proposed to 
launch a small satellite into orbit around the earth. After a spirited 
design competition between the National Academy of Sciences-
avy proposal (Vanguard) and the Army-Jet Propulsion Labora-
tory candidate (Explorer), the Navy design was chosen in September 
1955 as not interfering with the high-priority military missile 
programs, since it would use a new booster based on the Viking 
research rocket, and having a better tracking system and more scien-
tific growth potential. By 1957 Vanguard was readying its first test 
vehicles for firing. The USSR had also announced it would have an 
ICY satellite; the space race was extending beyond boosters to 
payloads. 
On the military front, space activity was almost bewildering. 
The missiles were moving toward the critical flight-test phase. Satel-
lite ideas were proliferating, though mostly on a ub-rosa planning 
basi ; after Sputnik these would become Tiros , weather satellite ; 
Transit, navigation satellite; Samos, reconnaissance satellite; Midas, 
missile early-warning satellite; Pioneer lunar probes; Discoverer 
re earch satellites. Payload size and weight were constant problems 
in all these concepts, with the limited thrust of the early rocket 
engines. Here the rapid advances in solid-state electronics came to 
the rescue by reducing volume and weight; with new techniques such 
as printed circuitry and transistors, the design engineers could· 
achieve new levels of miniaturization of equi pment. Even so, heavier 
payloads were obviously in the offing; more powerful engines had to 
be developed. So design was begun for several larger engines, topped 
by the monster F-1 engine, intended to produce 4450 kilonewtons of 
thrust-eight times the power of the engines that lifted the Atlas, 
Thor, and Jupiter missiles . 
All this activity, however, was still on the drawing board, work 
bench, or test stand on 4 October 1957, when the "beep, beep" 
signal from Sputnik 1 was heard around the world. The Soviet Union 
had orbited the world 's first artificial satellite. 
The American public's respon e was swift and widespread. It 
seemed equally compounded of alarm and chagrin. Our compla-
cent certainty that this nation was always number one in technology 
had been rudely shattered. Not only had the Russ ians been first-
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although that was bad enough-but Sputnik weighed an impressive 
83 kilograms against Vanguard's intended start at 1A kilograms and 
working up to 10 kilograms in later satellites. In a cold war environ-
ment, the contrast suggested undefined but ominous military 
implications. 
Fuel for such apprehensions added up rapidly. Less than a 
month after Sputnik 1 the Russians launched Sputnik 2, weighing a 
hefty 500 kilograms and carrying a dog as passenger. President 
Eisenhower, trying to dampen the growing concern, assured the 
public of our as-yet-undemonstrated progress and denied there was 
any military threat in the Soviet space achievements. As a counter the 
White Hou e announced the impending launch in December of the 
first Vanguard test vehicle capable of OTbit and belatedly authorized 
von Braun's Army research team in Huntsville to try to launch their 
Explorer-Jupiter combination. But pressures for dramatic action 
gathered rapidly. The media ballyhooed the carefully qualified 
announcement on Vanguard into great expectations of America's 
vindication. On 25 November Lyndon B.Johnson, Senate majority 
leader, chaired the first meeting of the Preparedness Investigation 
Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee. The hear-
ings would review the whole spectrum of American defense and 
space programs. 
Still the toboggan careened downhill. On 6 December 1957, the 
much-touted Vanguard test veh icle rose one meter from the launch 
platform, shuddered, and collapsed in flames. Its tiny lA-kilogram 
payload broke away and lay at the edge of the inferno, beeping 
impotently. 
Clouds of gloom deepened into the new year. Then, finally, a 
small rift. On 31 January 1958, an American satelli te at last went into 
orbit. Not Vanguard but the ABMA-JPL Explorer had redeemed 
American honor. True, the payload weighed only 14 kilograms 
against the 500 of Sputnik 2. But there was a scientific first; an 
experiment aboard the satelli te reported mysterious saturation of its 
radiation counters at 965 kilometers altitude. Prof. J ames A. Van 
Allen, the scientist who had built the experiment, thought this 
suggested the existence of a dense belt of radiation around the earth 
at that altitude. And American confidence perked up on 17 March 
when Vanguard 1 joined Explorer 1 in orbit. 
Meanwhile, in these same tense months, both consensus and 
competition had been forming on the political front: consensus that 
a national augmented space program was essential; competition as to 
, ------
A ball of fire and flying debris mark the explosive failure of the first A merican attempt to 
launch a satellite on Vanguard, 6 December 1957. 
who would run such a program, in what form, with what priorities. 
The Department of Defense, with its component military services, 
was an obvious front runner. The Atomic Energy Commission, 
already working with nuclear warheads and nuclear propulsion, had 
some congressional support, particularly in theJoint Committee on 
Atomic Energy. And there was NACA. 
NACA had devoted more and more of its facilities, budget, and 
expertise to missile research in the mid and late 1950s. Under the 
A moment oj triumph with the announcement that Explorer 1 has become the first 
American satellite to orbit the earth. H ere a duplicate Explorer is held aloft by (left to 
right) WiLliamH. PickeringojjPL,jamesA. VanAllen oJthe State University ojlowa, 
and Wemher von Braun oj ABMA. 
skillful leadership of James H. Doolittle, chairman, and Hugh L. 
Dryden, director, the strong NACA research team had come up with 
a solid, long-term, scientifically based proposal for a blend of aero-
nautic and space research. Its concept for manned spaceflight, for 
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example, envisioned a ballistic-shaped spacecraft with a blunt 
reentry shape, backed by a world-encircling tracking system, and 
equipped with dual automatic and manual controls that would 
enable the astronaut gradually to take over more and more of the 
flying of his spacecraft. Also NACA offered reassuring experience of 
long, close working relationships with the military services in so lv-
ing their research problems, while at the same time translating the 
research into civi l applications. But NACA's greatest political asset 
was its peaceful, research-oriented image. President Eisenhower and 
Senator Johnson and others in Congress were united in wanting 
above all to avoid projecting cold-war tensions into the new arena of 
outer space. 
By March 1958 the consensus in Washington had jelled. The 
administration position-largely credited to James R. Killian in the 
new post of president'S special assistant for science and technology-
the findings of J ohnson's Senate subcommittee, and the NACA 
proposal converged. America needed a national space program. The 
military component would of course be under DoD. But a civil 
component, lodged in a new agency, technologically and scien-
tifically based, would pick up certain of the existing space projects 
and forge an expanded program of space exploration in close 
concert with the military. All these concepts fed into draft legislation. 
On 2 April 1958, the administration bill for establishing a national 
aeronautics and space agency was submitted to Congress; both 
houses had already established select space committees; debate 
ensued; a number of refinements were introduced; and on 29 July 
1958 President Eisenhower signed into law P.L. 85-568, the National 
Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958. 
The act established a broad charter for civilian aeronautical and 
space research, with unique requirements for dissemination of 
information; absorbed the existing NACA into the new organization 
as its nucleus; and empowered broad transfers from other govern-
ment programs. The National Aeronautics and Space Administra-
tion came into being on 1 October 1958 . 
All this made for a very busy spring and summer for the people 
in the small NACA Headquarters in Washington. Once the general 
outlines of the new organization were clear, both a space program 
and a new organization had to be charted. In April Dryden brought 
Abe Silverstein, assistant director of Lewis Laboratory, to Wash-
ington to head the program planning. Ira Abbott, NACA assistant 
director for aerodynamic research, headed a committee to plan the 
NA SA's first high command. Hugh L. Dryden is presented his commission as deputy 
administrator fly President DwightD. Eisenhower with T Keith Glennan, administrator, 
looking on. 
Goddard Space Flight Center, 1967. This is the main NASA center Jor the design and 
operation oj scientific satellites. 
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new organization. In August President Eisenhower nominated 
T. Keith Glennan, president of Case Institute of Technology and 
former commissioner of the Atomic Energy Commission, to be the 
first administrator of the new organization, NASA, and Dryden to be 
deputy administrator. QuickJy confirmed by the Senate, they were 
sworn in on 19 August. Glennan reviewed the planning efforts, 
approved most. Talks with the Advanced Research Projects Agency 
identified the military space programs that were space-science 
oriented and obvious transfers to the new agency. Plans were formu-
lated for building a new center for space science research, satellite 
development, flight operations, and tracking. A site was chosen, two 
square kilometers ofthe Department of Agriculture's research center 
in Beltsville, Maryland. In March 1961 the Robert H. Goddard Space 
Flight Center (named for America's rocket pioneer) was dedicated . 
2 
The New Space Program 
On 1 October 1958, the 170 people in Headquarters gathered in 
the courtyard of their building, the Dolley Madison House, to hear 
Clennan proclaim the end of the 43-year-old NACA and the 
beginning of NASA. The 8000 people, three laboratories (now 
renamed research centers) and two stations, with a total facilities 
value of $300 million, and the annual budget of $100 million were 
transferred intact to NASA. On the same day, by executive order the 
president transferred to NASA Project Vanguard, its ISO-person 
staff, and remaining budget from the Naval Research Laboratory; 
lunar probes from the Army; lunar probes and rocket engine 
programs, including the F-I, from the Air Force; and a total of over 
$100 million of unexpended funds. NASA immediately delegated 
operational control of these projects back to the DoD agencies while 
it put its own house in order. 
There followed an intense two-year period of organization, 
build-up, fill-in, planning, and general catch-up. Only one week 
after NASA was formed, Clennan gave the go-ahead to Project 
Mercury, America's first manned spaceflight program. The Space 
Task Croup, headed by Robert R. Cilruth, was established at Langley 
to get the job done. The new programs brought into the organization 
were slowly integrated into the NACA nucleus. Many space-minded 
specialists were drawn into NASA, attracted by the exciting new 
vistas. Long-range planning was accelerated; the first NASA 10-year 
plan was presented to Congress in February 1960. It called for an 
expanding program on a broad front: manned flight, first orbital, 
then circumlunar; scientific satellites to measure radiation and 
other features of the near-space environment; lunar probes to 
measure the lunar space environment and to photograph the moon; 
planetary probes to measure and to photograph Mars and Venus; 
weather satellites to improve our knowledge of Earth's broad 
weather patterns; continued aeronautical research; and develop-
ment oflarger launch vehicles for lifting heavier payloads. Cost of the 
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program was expected to vary between $1 billion and $1.5 billion a 
year over the 10-year period. 
To conduct such a program, NASA obviously needed capabili-
ties it did not have. To that end Glennan sought to acquire the 
successful Army team that had launched America's first satellite, the 
Army Ballistic Missile Agency at Huntsville, Alabama, and its 
contractor, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena, California. 
The Army balked at losing the Huntsville group, claiming it was 
indispensable to the Army's military rocket program. Glennan for 
the time being had to compromise: ABMA would work on NASA 
programs as requested. The Army grudgingly gave up jPL. On 3 
December 1958, an executive order transferred, effective 31 Decem-
ber, the government-owned plant of jPL and the Army contract with 
the California Institute of Technology, under whichjPL was staffed 
and operated. Glennan renewed his bid for ABMA in 1959; 
protracted Army resistance was finally overcome and on 15 March 
1960 ABMA's 4000-man Development Operations Division, headed 
j et Propulsion Laboratory, 1963. This contractfacility has been the mainstay ojNASA 's 
lunar and planetary programs. 
A ground-test model oj the first stage oj Saturn V being hoisted onto the test stand at 
MarshaLL Space Flight Center, 1965. 
by Wernher von Braun, was transferred to NASA along with the big 
Saturn booster project. 
As the lO-year plan took shape and the capability grew, there 
were many other gaps to be filled. NASA was going to be markedly 
different from NACA in two important ways . First, it was going to be 
operational as well as do research. So, it would not only design and 
build launch vehicles and satellite but it would launch them, 
operate them, track them, acquire data from them, and interpret the 
data. Second, it would do the greater part of its work by contract 
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rather than in house as NACA had done. The first of these required 
tracking sites in many countries around the world, as well as 
construction of facilities: antennas, telemetry equipment, compu-
ters, radio and landline communications networks, etc. The second 
required the development of a larger and more sophisticated 
contracting operation than NACA had needed. In the first years, 
NASA leaned heavily on DoD for contracting assistance. Since its 
industrial contractors would be the same aerospace firms who were 
already doing extensive business with DoD, this was practical and 
workable, especially since NASA adopted most of the DoD pro-
curement system. 
The problem of launch vehicles occupied much attention in 
these first years. A family of existing and future launch vehicles had 
to be structured for the kinds of missions and spacecraft enumerated 
in the plan. In addition to the existing Redstone, Thor, and Atlas 
vehicles, NASA would develop: 
• Scout, a low-budget solid-propellant booster that could put 
small payloads in orbit; 
• Centaur, a liquid-hydrogen-fueled upper stage, transferred 
from DoD, that promised higher thrust and bigger payloads 
for lunar and planetary missions; 
The worldwide satellite tracking network, 1974. 
Legend: 
• Spaceflight Tracking and Data Network 
[STDN] Facilities 
.. Deep Space Network [DSN] Facilities 
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• Saturn, which was expected to be flying in 1963 (with the 
proper upper stages it would put upwards of 23 000 kilo-
grams in Earth orbit); 
• Nova, several times the size of Saturn, to be started later in 
the decade for the more ambitious manned lunar flights 
anticipated in the 1970s. 
In addition, work would continue with the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion on the difficult but enormously promising nuclear-propelled 
upper stage, Nerva, and on the Snap family oflong-life electric power 
producers. 
As much as larger boosters were needed, an even more 
immediate problem was how to improve the reliability of existing 
boosters. By December 1959 the United States had attempted 3 7 
satellite launches; less than one-third attained orbit. Electrical 
components, valves, turbopumps, welds, materials, structures-
virtually everything that went into the intricate mechanism called a 
booster- had to be redesigned or strengthened or improved to 
withstand the stresses of launch. A new order of perfection in 
manufacturing and assembly had to be instilled in workmen and 
managers. Rigorous, repeated testing had to verify each component, 
then subassembly, then total vehicle. That bugaboo of the engineer-
ing profession, constant fiddling and changing in search of perfec-
tion, had to be constrained in the interest of reliability. And since the 
existing vehicles were DoD products, NASA had to persuade DoD to 
enforce these rigorous standards on its contractors. 
That was only one of the areas in which close coordination 
between NASA and DoD was essential and effective. In manned 
spaceflight, for example, there were essentially four approaches to 
putting man into space: 
• the research airplane-the Air Force and NASA were already 
well into this program, leading to the X-15; 
• the ballistic vehicle-NASA's Project Mercury embodied 
this approach, with Air Force launch vehicles and DoD 
support throughout; 
• the boost-glider-the Air Force had inaugurated the Dyna-
Soar project (later renamed the X-20) in November 1957. A 
manned glider would be boosted into shallow Earth orbit, 
bounce in and out of the top of the atmosphere for part or all 
of a revolution of the planet, and land like an airplane. In 
May 1958 NACA had agreed to help with the technical side 
of the project. NASA continued that support; 
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• the lifting body-a bathtub-like shape proposed by Alfred J. 
Eggers of Ames Laboratory; as a reentry shape it would be 
midway between an airplane configuration and the ballistic 
shape, developing moderate lift during reentry and landing 
like an airplane. This approach would be deferred for a few 
years before being explored by the Air Force and NASA. 
In another area, communications satellites, DoD had its 
Courier program, a low-altitude, militarily secure communications 
satellite; it also had Advent, intended to be put into equatorial 
synchronous orbit by the Atlas-Centaur booster and provide global 
communications for the military. NASA had a passive communica-
tions satellite, Echo, a 30-meter inflatable sphere from which to 
bounce radar signals as a limited communications relay and, over a 
period of time and with accurate tracking, to plot the variations in air 
density at the top of the atmosphere by following the vagaries of its 
orbit. It had been agreed that NASA would leave active communica-
tions satellites (those that picked up, amplified, and rebroadcast 
radio signals from one point on Earth to another) to DoD. But this 
did not answer for long. By 1960 the American Telephone and 
Telegraph Company was asking NASA to launch its low-level, active 
communications satellite, Telstar. NASA also had another proposal 
for medium-altitude (roughly 17 900-kilometer orbit) communica-
tions satellites. 
The AT&T proposal raised a fundamental problem: would 
industry develop communications satellites entirely with its own 
money or would the government fund such research? NASA sought 
and received presidential approval to go both ways-to provide 
reimbursable launches to industry and to do its own communica-
tions satellite research. First there was Relay, the medium-altitude 
repeater satellite. Beyond lay the imaginative proposal from Hughes 
Aircraft Company for Syncom, a synchronous-orbit satellite-one 
that would fly at 35 OOO-kilometer altitude, where distance, gravity, 
and velocity combined to place a satellite permanently over the same 
spot on Earth; by virtue of the lofty orbit, three of these satellites 
could cover the entire planet and require only a handful of ground 
stations. 
By the time of the presidential election of 1960 the worst pangs 
of reorganization, redefinition, and planning were over. Programs 
were meshing with each other; contracting for large projects was 
becoming routine; the initial absorption of DoD programs had been 
completed; and a viable organization was in business. 
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!here were operational bright spots as well. True, launch 
vehicles were still fickle and unpredictable-7 out of 17 launches 
failed in 1959. But finally in August 1959, NASA launched its first 
satellite that functioned in all respects (Explorer 6). Pioneer 5, launched 
on 11 March 1960 and intended to explore interplanetary space 
between Earth and Venus, communicated out to a new distance 
record, 35.7 million kilometers. The first of the prototype weather 
satellites, Tiros 1, launched on 1 April 1960, produced 22500 photos 
of Earth's weather. Echo 1, the first passive communications satellite, 
was launched 12 August 1960, inflated in orbit, and provided a 
passive target for bouncing long-range communications from one 
point on Earth to another. Perhaps as important, millions of people 
saw the moving pinpoint of light in the night sky and were awed by 
the experience. 
In late 1960 politics bemused the space program. Although not 
a direct campaign issue in the presidential campaign, the space 
program found little reassurance of its priority as an expensive new 
item in the federal budget. After John F. Kennedy was narrowly 
An early Tiros photo of the Great Lakes area on a wintry day. 
A HISTORY OF ACA AND ASA, 191 5- 1980 27 
elected, the uncertainty deepened. Jerome B. Wiesner, the president-
elect's science adviser, chaired a committee which produced a report 
both critical of the space program's progress to date and skeptical of 
its future. Who would be the new administrator? What, if any, 
priority would the fledgling space program have in a new, on-record-
hostile administration? 
Then, once again, challenge and response. On 12 April 1961, 
Soviet Cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin rode Vostok 1 into a 30 1-by-17 4-
kilometer orbit of the earth. After one orbit he reentered the 
atmosphere and landed safely. Man had flown in space. Gagarin 
joined that elite pantheon of men who were the first to do the 
undoable-the Wright brothers, Lindbergh, now Gagarin. There 
was faint consolation on 5 May 1961, when Mercury essayed its first 
manned spaceflight. Astronaut Alan B. Shepard,jr., rodea Redstone 
booster in his Freedom 7 Mercury spacecraft for a I5-minute 
suborbital flight and was picked out of the water 487 kilometers 
downrange. Success, yes; a good beginning, yes. But Gagarin had 
flown around the earth, 40 000 kilometers against Shepard's 487. His 
Vostok weighed 4730 kilograms in orbit, contrasting with Mercury's 
953 kilograms in suborbit. Gagarin had had about 89 minutes in 
weighdessness, the mysterious zero-gravity condition that had 
supplanted the sound barrier as the great unknown. Shepard 
experienced 5 minutes of weighdessness. By any unit of measure-
ment, the United States was clearly still behind, especially in the 
indispensable prerequisite of rocket power. As the new president 
had said, gloomily: "We are behind .... the news will be worse before 
it is better, and it will be some time before we catch up." 
The public reaction was less emphatic than after Sputnik 1 but 
congressional concern was strong. Robert C. Seamans,jr., NASA's 
associate administrator and general manager, was hard put to 
restrain Congress from forcing more money on NASA than could be 
effectively used. 
President Kennedy was especially concerned. His inaugural 
address in January had rung with an eloquent promise of bold new 
initiatives that would "get this country moving again." The suc-
ceeding three months had been distinguished by crushing setbacks-
the Bay of Pigs invasion fiasco and the Gagarin flight. As one of 
several searches for new initiatives, the president asked his vice 
president, Lyndon B. Johnson, to head a study of what would be 
required in the space program to convincingly surpass the Soviets . 
johnson, the only senior White House figure in the new administra-
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tion with prior commitment to the space program, found strong 
support waiting in the wings. James E. Webb, new administrator of 
NASA, had an established reputation as an aggressive manager of 
large enterprises, both in industry and in the Truman administra-
tion as director of the Bureau of the Budget and undersecretary of 
state. Backed by the seasoned technical judgment of Dryden, his 
deputy, and Seamans, his general manager, Webb moved vigorously 
to accelerate and expand the central elements of the NASA lO-year 
plan. 
The largest single concept in that plan had been manned cir-
cumlunar flight. Now the question became: could this country rally 
quickly enough to beat the Soviets to that circumlunar goal? The 
considered technical estimate was: not for sure. But if we went one 
large step further and escalated the commitment to manned lunar 
landing and return, it became a new ball game. Both nations would 
have to design and construct a whole new family of boosters and 
spacecraft; this would be an equalizer in terms of challenge to both 
nations and the experts were confident that the depth and compe-
tence of the American government-industry-university team would 
prove superior. In this judgment they found a strong ally in the new 
secretary of defense, Robert S. McNamara. 
But Webb and his advisers were not content with a one-shot 
objective. The goal, they said, was a major space advance on a broad 
front-manned spaceflight, yes, but also boosters, communications 
satellites, meteorological satellites, scientific satellites, planetary 
exploration. 
This was the combined proposal presented to the vice president 
and approved and transmitted by him to the president. It was the 
best new initiative the president had seen. So it was that on 25 May 
1961 the president stood before a joint session of Congress and 
proposed a historic national goal: 
Now it is time co rake longer stride -time for a great new Ameri can 
enterprise-time for thi s nati on to rake a clearly leading role in space 
achievement, which in many ways may hold the key to our future o n earth . . . 
. . . I believe that thi s nation should commit itself to achieving the goal, 
before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him 
safely to the earth . 0 single space proj ect in this period will be more 
impress ive to man kind , o r mo re im portant fo r the long-range ex ploration of 
space; and no ne will be so d ifficul t or expensive to acco mplish . 
The president correctly assessed the national mood. Editorial 
support was widespread. Congressional debate was perfunctory, 
PresidentJohnF. Kennedy on 25 May 1961 recommended to a joint session oJCongress 
that the United States undertake the challenge oJlanding men on the moon and returning 
them to Earth in the decade oj the 19605. 
given the size of the commitment. The decision to land a man on the 
moon was endorsed virtually without dissent. 
THE LUNAR COMMITMENT 
NASA was exhilarated but awed. Dryden had returned from a 
White House meeting to tell his staff that " this man" (Webb) had sold 
the president on landing a man on the moon. Cilruth, immersed in 
what seemed to be big enough problems in the relatively modest 
Project Mercury, was temporarily aghast. But the die was cast. The 
nation had accepted the challenge to its largest technological 
enterprise, dwarfing even the wartime Manhattan Project for devel-
oping the atomic bomb and the postwar crash development of 
strategic missiles. 
The blank check was there; the way to use it was far from clear. 
Since 1958, studies had been under way on a circumlunar manned 
flight. Since 1959, George M. Low, head of the manned spaceflight 
office in Headquarters, had ramrodded a series of progressively 
more detailed studies on the requirements for a manned landing on 
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the moon. Those studies had established a broad confidence that no 
major technological or scientific breakthroughs were needed to get a 
man to the moon or even to land and return him. But there were 
some operational unknowns; the blank check caused them suddenly 
to loom larger. The assumption had been that one simply built a big 
enough booster, flew directly to the moon, landed a large vehicle, 
and returned some part of it directly to Earth. But there were wide 
scientific disagreements as to the nature of the lunar surface. Was it 
solid "ground," strong enough to support such a load? Or was it 
many feet of dust, in which a spacecraft would disappear without a 
trace? Or was it something in between? There were operational 
problems too: could the crew and ground control possibly handle 
the enormous peak of work that would bunch together in the landing 
phase of a direct-ascent mission? The alternative seemed to be that 
one boosted pieces of a lunar vehicle into Earth orbit, assembled and 
refueled them there, and took off for a direct landing on the moon. 
This too was fraught with hazards: could payloads rendezvous in 
Earth orbit? Could men assemble complex equipment in the 
demanding environment of space? Could such operations as refuel-
ing with volatile fuels-hazardous enough on Earth-be safely 
performed in space? 
Some points were clear. The very massiveness of the effort 
would make this program different in kind from anything NASA had 
attempted. New organizational modes were essential; no one center 
could handle this program. A much stronger Headquarters team 
would be needed, coordinating the effous of several centers and 
riding herd on an enormous mobilization of American industry and 
university effort. 
Also, there were long-lead-time problems that needed to be 
worked on irrespective of later decisions. One of these was three 
years under way-a big engine. Work on the 4400-kilonewton-thrust 
F-l engine would be accelerated. Another was a navigation system; 
accurate vectoring of a spacecraft from Earth to a precise point on a 
rapidly moving moon 370000 kilometers away was a formidable 
problem in celestial mechanics. Therefore the first large Apollo 
contract was let to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and its 
Instrumentation Laboratory, headed by C. Stark Draper, to begin 
study of this inscrutable problem and to develop the requisite 
navigational system. 
The basic spacecraft could be delineated-the one in which a 
crew would depart the earth, travel to the moon, and return. It 
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should have a baggage car, a jettisonable service module housing the 
propulsion, expendable oxygen, etc. The Space Task Group was 
hard at work on these with its left hand, while its main effort on 
Mercury went forward. That left hand had to be strengthened. 
A whole new logistics system was needed; from factory to 
launch, everything had outstripped normal sizes and normal trans-
portation. There would have to be new factories, mammoth test 
stands, huge launch complexes. Railroads and highways could not 
handle the larger components. Ship transportation seemed the only 
answer. A massive facility design and site location program had to 
begin even before the final configuration of the vehicle was decided. 
Limited in the facilities and construction area, NASA decided to call 
on the tested resources of the Army Corps of Engineers. It proved to 
be one of the wiser decisions in this hectic period. 
As planning went forward in 1961 and 1962, order gradually 
emerged. A new concept for how to get to the moon painfully 
surfaced: lunar-orbit rendezvous. A small group at Langley, headed 
by John C. Houbolt, had studied the trade-offs of direct ascent, 
Earth-orbit rendezvous, and other possibilities. They had been 
increasingly struck with the vehicle and fuel economics of this 
mission profile: after stabilizing in Earth orbit, a set of spacecraft 
went to orbit around the moon, and, leaving the mother spacecraft in 
lunar orbit, dispatched a smaller craft to land on the lunar surface, 
reconnoiter, and rejoin the mother craft in lunar orbit for the return 
to Earth. Over a period of two years they refined their complex 
mathematics and argued their case. As time b~came critical for 
definition of the launch vehicle, they argued their case before one 
NASA audience after another. Finally Houbolt, in a bold move, went 
outside of "channels" and got the personal attention of Seamans. 
This was a decision of such importance to the total program that 
imposed decision was not enough; the major elements of NASA had 
to be won over and concur in the final technical judgment. 
Dismissed at first as risky and very literally " far out," lunar orbit 
rendezvous gradually won adherents. In July 1962 D. Brainerd 
Holmes, NASA director of manned spaceflight, briefed the House 
space committee on lunar orbit rendezvous, the chosen method of 
going to the moon. 
Once made, this decision permitted rapid definition of the 
Apollo spacecraft combination. Launch vehicle configuration had 
been arrived at seven months earlier. The objective would be to put a 
payload of nearly 136000 kilograms in Earth orbit and 45000 
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kilograms in orbit around the moon. To do this required a three-
stage vehicle, the first stage employing the F-l engine in a cluster of 
five, to provide 33000 kilonewtons of thrust at launch. The second 
stage would cluster five of a new 890-kilonewton-thrust liquid 
hydrogen and liquid oxygen engine (the J-2). The third stage, 
powered by a singleJ-2 engine, would boost the Apollo three-man 
spacecraft out of Earth orbit and into the lunar gravitational field. At 
that point the residual three-spacecraft combination would take 
over: a command module housing the astronauts, a service module 
providing propulsion for maneuvers, and a two-man lunar module 
for landing on the moon. The engine on the service module would 
ignite to slow the spacecraft enough to be captured into lunar orbit; 
the fragile lunar mod ule would leave the mother craft and descend to 
land its two passengers on the moon. After lunar reconnaissance, the 
astronauts would blast off in the top half of the lunar module to 
rejoin the mother craft in lunar orbit, and the service module would 
fire up for return to Earth. 
A smaller launch vehicle, which would later be dubbed the 
Saturn IB, would be built first and used to test the Apollo spacecraft 
in Earth orbit. Even this partial fulfillment of the Apollo mission 
would require a first stage of 7300 kilonewtons of thrust and a high-
energy liquid oxygen-liquid hydrogen second stage. 
The grand design was now complete. But in the articulating of it, 
vast gaps in experience and technology were revealed. At three 
critical points the master plan depended on successful rendezvous 
and docking of spacecraft. Although theoretically feasible, it had 
never been done and was not within the scope of Project Mercury. 
How could practical experience be gained with rendezvous and 
docking short of an intricate, hideously expensive, and possibly 
disastrous series of experiments with Apollo hardware? Men would, 
hopefully, land and walk upon the moon. But could men and their 
equipment function in space outside the artificial and confining 
environment of their spacecraft? Other systems and other questions 
could be engineered to solution on Earth, but the ultimate questions 
here could only be answered in space. We had bitten off more than 
we could chew. Clearly somethingwas needed between the first steps 
of Mercury and the grand design of Apollo. The gap was too great to 
jump when men's lives were at stake. 
Even Mercury sometimes seemed a very big mouthful to chew. 
But slowly, stubborn problem after stubborn problem yielded. The 
second suborbital flight, Liberty Bell 7, was launched on 21 July 1961; 
its 16-minute flight went well, though on landing the hatch blew off 
AstronautJohn H. Glenn, Jr., aboard his Mercury spacecraft Friendship 7, rose off the 
lauTI£h pad at Cape Canaveral on 20 February 1962 to become the first American to 
orbit the earth. 
prematurely and the spacecraft sank just after Astronaut Virgil 1. 
Grissom was hoisted to safety in a rescue helicopter. In September 
the unmanned Mercury-Atlas combination was orbited successfully 
and landed where it was supposed to, east of Bermuda. On 29 
November the final test flight took chimpanzee Enos on a two-orbit 
ride and landed him in good health. The system was qualified for 
manned orbital flight. And on 20 February 1962, AstronautJohn H. 
I 
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Glenn, Jr., became the first American to orbit the earth in space. 
Friendship 7 circled the earth three times; Glenn flew parts of the last 
two orbits manually because of trouble with his autopilot. 
The United States took its astronaut heroes to its heart with an 
enthusiasm that bewildered them and startled NASA. Their mail was 
enormous; hundreds of requests for personal appearances poured 
in. Glenn had a rainy parade in Washington and addressed a joint 
session of Congress. On 1 March four million people in New York 
showered confetti and ticker tape on him and fellow astronauts 
Shepard and Grissom. Nor was the event unnoticed by the competi-
tion. President Kennedy announced the day after the Glenn flight 
that Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev had congratulated the nation 
on its achievement and had suggested the two nations "could work 
together in the exploration of space." The results of this exchange 
were a series of talks between Dryden of NASA and Anatoliy A. 
Blagonravov of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. By the end of the 
year they had agreed to exchanges of meteorological and magnetic-
field data and some communications experiments. 
A big year for the young American space program, 1962. Two 
more Mercury flights, Carpenter for three orbits, then Schirra for six. 
The powerful Saturn booster made its first two test flights, both 
successful. The first active communications satellite, Telstar 1, was 
launched for AT&T by NASA; later NASA's own Relay communications 
satellite was orbited; and the first international satellite, Britain's Ariel 1, 
was launched by NASA to take scientific measurements of the 
ionosphere. Mariner 2 became the first satellite to fly by another 
planet; on 14 December it passed within 34400 kilometers of Venus 
and scanned the surface of that cloud-shrouded body, measuring its 
temperatures. Then it continued into orbit about the sun, eventually 
setting a new communications distance record of 89 million kilo-
meters. The fifth and sixth Tiros meteorological satellites were 
placed in orbit and continued to report the world's weather. So 
successful had Tiros been that the R&D program had quickly 
become semioperational. The Weather Bureau was regularly inte-
grating Tiros data into its operational forecasting and was busy 
planning a full-scale weather satellite system which it would operate. 
And the hard work on booster reliability began to pay off-18 
successes to 9 failures or partial successes. 
Not that all was sweetness and light. The Ranger, designed to 
photograph the moon while falling to impact the lunar surface, was 
in deep trouble. A high-technology program at the edge of the state 
L ___ _ 
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of the art, Ranger closed the year with five straight failures and 
another would come in 1963.JPL, the NASA agent; Hughes Aircraft 
Co. , the contractor; and NASA Headquarters came under heavy 
pressure from Congress. Studies were made; reorganization re-
aligned ]PL and contractor to firm commitment to the project; 
NASA dropped the science experiments, and the last three Ranger 
flights were spectacularly successful, providing close-in lunar photog-
raphy that excelled the best telescopic detail of the moon from Earth 
by 2000 times and dispelled many of the scare theories about the 
lunar surface. 
Ranger 7 took this photograph oJ the lunar surface from an altitude oj about 6 
kilometers, 2.3 seconds before it crashed. The crater in the upper left corner measured 
about 91 meters in diameter and had an angular rock mass in its center which might 
have been the cause oj the crater. 
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As the dimensions of Apollo began to dawn on Congress and 
the scientific community, there were rumbles: Apollo would pre-
empt too much of the scientific manpower of the nation; Apollo was 
an "other worldly" stunt, directed at the moon instead of at pressing 
problems on Earth. Administrator Webb met both of these caveats 
with positive programs. 
In acknowledgment of the drain on scientific manpower, Webb 
won White House su pport for a broad program by NASA to augment 
the scientific manpower pool. Thousands offellowships were offered 
for graduate study in space-related disciplines, intended to replace 
or at least supplement the kinds of talent engulfed by the space 
program. Complementing the fellowships was an even more innova-
tive program, government-financed buildings and facilities on 
university campuses for the new kinds of interdisciplinary training 
that the space program required. 
From a modest beginning in 1962, by the end of the program in 
1970 NASA had footed the bill for the graduate education of 5000 
scientists and engineers at a cost of over $100 million, had spent 
some $32 million in construction of new laboratory facilities on 32 
university campuses, and had given multidisciplinary grants to some 
50 universities that totaled more than $50 million. The program 
marked a new direction in the government's recognition of its 
responsibility for impact of its program on the civilian economy and 
a new dimension of cooperation between the university and the 
government. In part as a result of these new capabilities in the 
universities, NASA contracts and grants for research by universities 
rose from $21 million in 1962 to $101 million in 1968. The NASA 
university program proved very effective: on the political side it 
reduced tensions between NASA and the scientific-engineering 
community; on the score of national technology capability it 
enlarged and focused a large segment of the research capabilities of 
the universities. 
To refute the other charge-that Apollo would serve only its 
own ends and not the broader needs of the nation's economy-
Webb created the NASA technology utilization program in 1962. Its 
basic purpose was to identify and hold up to the light the many items 
of space technology that could be or had been adapted for uses in the 
civilian economy. By 1973 some 30000 such uses had been 
identified and new ones were rolling in at the rate of 2000 a year. 
But the program went beyond that. A concerted effort was made 
in every NASA center not only to identify possible transfers of space 
I-
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the College of William and Mary, the University of Virginia, and Virginia Polytechnic 
Institute. Generating 600 million electron volts, this nuclear giant employs a large 
electromagnet to accelerate positive hydrogen ions to eight-tenths the speed oj light; the 
particles are then extracted Jor use in high-energy radiation experiments. 
technology but to use NASA technical people and contractors to 
explore and even perform prototype research on promising applica-
tions. NASA publications described all these potential applications 
to researchers and industry; seven regional dissemination centers 
were established to work directly with industry on technical prob-
lems in the adaptation of space technology; in 1973 some 2000 
companies received direct help and another 57000 queries were 
answered. New products ranged from quieter aircraft engines to 
microminiaturized and solid-state electronics that revolutionized 
1V sets, radios, and small electronic calculators. NASA's computer 
software programs enabled a wide range of manufacturers to test the 
life history of new systems- see predictions of problems that could 
develop, how the systems would perform, how long they would last, 
etc. Many other facets of the space program were important to the 
quality and sustenance oflife for citizens of the United States and the 
world: 
Communications. Within a decade the communications satellite 
I 
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proved to be a reliable, flexible, cost-effective addition to long-range 
communications. The Communications Satellite Corporation be-
came a solid financial success, with 114 000 stockholders. As 
manager of the International Telecommunications Satellite Con-
sortium, it shared access to the global satellite system with 82 other 
nations who had become members of the consortium. Its array of 
sophisticated Intelsat communications satellites bracketed the world 
from synchronous orbit. Before these satellites existed, the total 
capability for transoceanic telephone calls had been 500 circuits; in 
1973 the Intelsat satellites alone offered more than 4000 trans-
oceanic circuits. Real-time TV coverage of events anywhere in the 
world-whether Olympics, wars, or coronations-had become a 
commonplace in the world's living rooms. Satellite data transmis-
sion enabled industries to control far-flung production and inven-
tories, airlines to have instantaneous coast-to-coast reservation 
systems, large banks to have nationwide data networks. And this 
communications revolution was only beginning. The next genera-
tion of communications satellite, Intelsat 5, started operations in 
1976 with five times the capacity of its predecessor Intelsat 4 and a life 
expectancy of 10 years in orbit. In 1976 the Maritime Administra-
tion embarked on a global ship-control system operated by means of 
satellites. Experiments with A TS satellites would continue to refine 
the life-saving biomedical communication network which links 
medical personnel and medical centers across the nation. Especially 
valuable to isolated and rural areas, the network would afford them 
real-time access to expert diagnosis and prescription of treatment. 
Weather forecasting. Like its brother the communications satellite, 
the weather satellite had in less than a decade become an established 
friend of people around the world. Potentially disastrous hurricanes 
such as Camille in August 1969 and Agnes in June 1972 were 
spotted, tracked, and measured by the operational weather satellite 
network of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. 
The real-time knowledge of the storm's position, intensity, and track 
made possible accurate early warning and emergency evacuation 
that saved hundreds of lives and millions of dollars in property 
damage. Near-global rainfall maps were being produced by 1973 
from data acquired by NASA's Nimbus 5. Not only did the heat-
release information contained in such data markedly improve long-
range weather forecasting, but the data were of immediate value in 
agriculture, flood control, etc. Ice-movement charts for the Arctic 
and Antarctic regions were extending shipping schedules in these 
areas by several months each year. 
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Medicine. NASA's experience in microminiaturized electronics 
and in protecting and monitoring the health of astronauts during 
spaceflight generated hundreds of medical devices and techniques 
that could save lives and improve health care. Multidisciplinary 
teams of space technicians and medical researchers were successful 
in developing long-duration heart pacers, for instance. Implanted in 
the patient's body but rechargeable from outside, the tiny pacer 
would regulate the heartbeat for decades without replacement, 
whereas the previous model required surgical replacement every two 
years. Space-derived automatic patient monitoring systems were 
being used in more and more hospitals. Tiny sensors on the patient's 
body would trigger an alarm when there was significant change in 
temperature, heartbeat, blood pressure, or even in the oxygen-
carbon dioxide levels in the blood, a signal of the onset of shock. For 
researchers living inside space simulators for long periods of time, 
the Ames Research Center developed an aspirin-sized transmitter 
pill. In general medical practice, the transmitter pill was swallowed 
This laminar flow clean room and special clothing are used at St. Luke's Hospital, 
Denver, to lower risk of infection in hip10int replacements and other surgical procedures. 
Both the room and the clothing were based on space-program experience and were 
developed under NASA contract by the Martin Marietta Corp. 
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by the patient; as it moved through the digestive system it radioed to 
the doctor diagnostic measurements of any of several kinds of deep-
body conditions-temperatures, stomach acid levels, etc. 
Energy. The nation's stepped-up program of energy research 
that began in 1973 found NASA with broad experience and an in-
being program of research in devices that collect, store, transmit, and 
apply solar, nuclear, and chemical energy for production of mechan-
ical and electrical power. Solar cells had produced the electric power 
for several generations of spacecraft; when arrays of them were 
experimentally mounted on houses they supplied as much as three-
quarters of the energy needed to heat and cool the house. But solar 
cells were too expensive to be competitive with other systems; work 
was continuing on improving their efficiency and on new manufac-
turing techniques that would cut their cost in half. A long-standing 
problem with the efficient use of electrical energy has been the 
inability to store significant amounts of it for future use. NASA had 
done much work on developing more compact, higher-storage-
capacity, longer-life batteries. Nickel-cadmium batteries developed 
for the space program were already in general use; they could be 
recharged in 6 to 20 minutes instead of the 16 to 24 hours required 
for conventional batteries. Silver-zinc batteries used in spacecraft 
were too expensive for commercial use, but their unique separator 
material could double the capacity of conventional nickel-zinc 
batteries. An extensive trial of this adaptation was begun with the 
fleet of Postal Service electric trucks. Batteries with 5 to 20 times the 
storage capacity of conventional mass-produced automobile bat-
teries could have a wide range of uses: low-pollution automobile 
propulsion; storage of excess electrical power generated during low-
demand hours and release at times of peak demand, etc. Fuel cells 
had been developed by NASA to provide the longer duration Gemini 
and Apollo flights with electrical power; on Earth they could be used 
either for energy storage or energy conversion. One of the ingre-
dients used in fuel cells was hydrogen; in this application hydrogen 
was broken down and combined with oxygen in a complex chemical 
process that produced water and electrical energy. But hydrogen is 
also a superb high-performance, low-pollutant fuel whose source is 
inexhaustible. Liquid hydrogen had propelled men to and from the 
moon. With its years of work with hydrogen as a rocket fuel, NASA 
had more experience thaIl anyone else in the production, transporta-
tion, storage, pumping, and use of hydrogen. One possible use of 
hydrogen was as compact, clean energy that could be transported 
I 
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into large urban areas. Many kinds of Earth-based power plants 
could burn hydrogen, alone or in various combinations, to produce 
energy with low pollution side effects. 
APOLLO IMPACT 
The creation of NASA's university and technology transfer 
programs in the early 1960s could be considered a side effect of 
Apollo. There were others. All lunar reconnaissance programs had 
been impacted by Apollo. The latter part of Ranger had been 
reoriented; Surveyor, the first lunar softlander, was reconfigured to 
support Apollo. If Surveyor worked, it would provide on-the-lunar-
surface photography plus televised digging in the surface of the 
moon for a better sense of soil composition. The remaining problem 
for Apollo was the need for detailed mapping photography of the 
moon. So by the end of 1963 a third program was initiated - Lunar 
Orbiter, a state-of-the-art mapping satellite that would go into orbit 
around the moon and photograph potential landing zones for 
Apollo. 
The vexing questions of rendezvous and extravehicular activity 
still had to be answered. So on 3 January 1962 NASA announced a 
new manned spaceflight project, Gemini . Using the basic configura-
tion of the Mercury capsule enlarged to hold a two-man crew, 
Gemini was to fit between Mercury and Apollo and provide early 
answers to assist the design work on Apollo. The launch vehicle 
would be the Titan II missile being developed by the Air Force. More 
powerful than Atlas and Titan I, it would have the thrust to put the 
larger spacecraft into Earth orbit. For a target vehicle with which 
Gemini could rendezvous, NASA chose the Air Force's Agena; 
launched by an Atlas, the second-stage Agena had a restartable 
engine that enabled it to have both passive and active roles. Gemini 
would be managed by the same Space Task Group that was operating 
Mercury; the project director would be James A. Chamberlin, an 
early advocate of an enlarged Mercury capsule. 
Gemini began as a Mark II Mercury, a " quick and dirty" 
program. The only major engineering change aside from scale-up 
was to modularize the various electrical and control assemblies and 
place them outside the inner shell of the spacecraft to simplify 
maintenance. But perhaps not an engineer alive could have left it at 
that. After all, Gemini was supposed to bridge to Apollo, wasn't it? 
Here was a chance to try out ideas. If they worked, they would be 
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available for Apollo. There was the paraglider, for example, that 
Francis Rogallo had been experimenting with at Langley. If that 
worked, Gemini could forget parachutes and water landings with 
half the Navy out there; with a paraglider Gemini could land 
routinely on land. And the spacecraft should be designed to have 
more aerodynamic lift than Mercury, so the pilot would have more 
landing control. And fuel cells instead of batteries; with enough 
electric power you could have longer duration fhghts. And fighter-
plane-type ejection seats for crew abort, superseding the launch 
escape rocket that perched on top of Mercury. 
All these innovations were cranked into the program, and 
contracts and subcontracts were let for their design and fabrication. 
Soon the monthly bills for Gemini were running far beyond what 
had been budgeted. In every area, it seemed, there were costly 
problems. The paraglider and ejection seats wouldn't stabilize in 
flight; the fuel cell leaked; Titan II had longitudinal oscillations-the 
Manned Spacecraft Center, 1970. RenamedJohnson Space Center in 1973, this has 
been the lead center Jor the design and development of manned spacecraft and Jor the 
operational control of manned spaceflights. 
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dreaded "pogo" effect-too severe for manned flights; Agena had 
reconfiguration problems. Cost overruns had become severe by late 
1962; by March 1963 they were critical. The original program cost of 
$350 million had zoomed to over $1 billion -$200 million higher 
than the figures Associate Administrator Seamans had used in 
Congress a few days before! Charles W. Mathews, the new program 
manager, cracked down. Flight schedules were stretched out; the 
paraglider gradually slid out of the program. By early 1964 most of 
the engineering problems were responding to treatment. 
With the Mercury program, the spacecraft design role in Apollo, 
and now Gemini, it was clear that the Space Task Group needed a 
home of its own and some growing room. On 19 September 1961 , 
Administrator Webb announced that a new Manned Spacecraft 
Center would be built on the outskirts of Houston. It would house 
the enlarged Space Task Group, now upgraded to a center, and 
would have operational control of all manned missions as well as be 
the developer of manned spacecraft. Water access to the Gulf of 
Mexico was provided by the ship canal to Galveston. 
Michoud Operations, 1965. 
The Mississippi Test Facility headquarters building, 1966. It is now the National Space 
Technology Laboratories. 
Water access played a role in all site selection for new Apollo 
facilities. The big Michoud Ordnance Plant outside New Orleans, 
where the 10-meter-diameter Saturn V first stage would be fabri-
cated, was on the Mississippi River; the Mississippi Test Facility, with 
its huge test stands for static firing tests of the booster stages, was just 
off the Gulf of Mexico, in Pearl River County, Mississippi. 
All this effort would come together at the launch site at Cape 
Canaveral, Florida, where NASA had a small Launch Operations 
Center, headed by Kurt H. Debus. NASA had been a tenant there, 
using Air Force launch facilities and tracking range. Now Apollo 
loomed. Apollo would require physical facilities much too large to fit 
on the crowded Cape. For safety's sake there would have to be large 
buffer zones of land around the launch pads; if a catastrophic 
accident occurred, where all stages of the huge launch vehicle 
exploded at once, the force of the detonation would approach that of 
a small atomic bomb. So NASA sought and received congressional 
approval to purchase 450 square kilometers of Merritt Island, just 
northwest of the Air Force facilities. Lying between the Banana River 
and the Atlantic and populated mostly by orange growers, Merritt 
Island had the requisite water access and safety factors. 
Planners struggled through 1961 with a wide range of concepts 
and possibilities for the best launch system for Apollo, hampered by 
having only a gross knowledge of how the vehicle would be 
[ 
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configured, what the missions would involve, and how frequent the 
launches would be. Finally on 21 July 1962 NASA announced its 
choice: the Advanced Saturn (later Saturn V) launch vehicle would be 
transported to the new Launch Operations Center on Merritt Island 
stage by stage; the stages would be erected and checked out in an 
enormous vehicle assembly building; the vehicle would be trans-
ported to one of the four launch pads several miles away by a huge 
tractor crawler. This system was a major departure from previous 
practice at the Cape; launch vehicles had usually been erected on the 
launch pad and checked out there. Under the new concept the 
vehicle would be on the launch pad a much shorter time, allowing for 
a higher launch rate and better protection against weather and salt 
spray. As with the other new Apollo facilities, the Corps of Engineers 
would supervise the vast construction project. 
The simultaneous building of facilities and hardware was going 
to take a great deal of money and a great many skilled people. The 
NASA budget, $966.7 million in fiscal 1961 , was $1.825 billion in FY 
1962. It hit $3.674 billion the next year and by FY 1964 was $5.1 
Kennedy Space Center, 1966. A I11 -meter-tall Saturn V launch vehicle has emerged 
from the cavernous Vehicle Assembly Building on its 1820-metric-ton crawler and 
begun its stately processional to the launch complex five kilometers away. 
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billion. It would remain near that level for three more years. In 
personnel, NASA grew in those same years from 17 471 to 35 860. 
And of course this was small potatoes compared to the mushroom-
ing contractor and university force where 90 percent of NASA's 
money was spent. When the Apollo production line peaked in 1967, 
more than 400000 people were working on some aspect of Apollo. 
Indeed, as the large bills began to come in, there was some 
wincing in the political system. President Kennedy wondered briefly 
if the goal was worth the cost; in 1963 Congress had its first real 
adversary debate on Apollo. Administrator Webb had to point out 
again and again that this was not a one-shot trip to the moon but the 
building of a national space capability that would have many uses. 
He also needled congressmen with the fact that the Soviets were still 
ahead; in 1963 they were orbiting two-man spacecraft, flying a 208-
kilometer-orbit tandem mission, and orbiting an unmanned proto-
type of a new spacecraft. Support rallied. The Senate rejected an 
amendment that would have cut the FY 1964 space budget by $500 
million. The speech that President Kennedy was driving through 
Dallas to deliver on that fateful 22 November 1963 would have 
defended the expenditures for the space program: 
This effort is expensive-but it pays its own way, for freedo m and for Ameri ca . . 
. . There is no longer any doubt about the strength and skill of American 
science, American industry, American education and the American free 
enterprise system. In short, our national space effort represents a great gain in , 
and a great resource of, o ur national strength. 
As 1963 drew to a close, NASA could feel that it was on top of its 
job. The master plan for Apollo was drawn; the organization and the 
key men were in place. Mercury had ended with L. Gordon Cooper's 
22-orbit flight, far beyond the design limits of the spacecraft. For 
those Americans old enough to have thrilled to Lindbergh's historic 
transatlantic flight 36 years earlier, it was awesome that in only 50 
minutes more flight time, Cooper had flown 955000 kilometers to 
Lindbergh's 5000. Of 13 NASA launches during the year, 11 were 
successful. In addition to improved performance from the estab-
lished launch vehicles, Saturn I had another successful test flight, as 
did the troublesome Centaur. The Syncom 2 communications satel-
ljte achieved synchronous orbit and from that lofty perch trans-
mitted voice and teletype communications between North America, 
South America, and Africa. The Explorer 18 scientific satellite sailed 
out in a long elliptical orbit to measure radiation most of the way to 
the moon. 
I 
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Tortoise Becomes Hare 
As 1964 dawned, the worst of Gemini's troubles were behind. 
The spacecraft for the first flight was already at the Kennedy Space 
Center (Launch Operations Center, renamed in November 1963 by 
President Lyndon B. Johnson), being minutely checked out for the 
flight. Too minutely, too time-consumingly. Not until 8 April did 
Gemini 1 lift off unmanned into an orbit which confirmed the launch 
vehicle-spacecraft combination in the rigors of launch. The exces-
sive checkout time of Gemini 1 generated a new procedure. Beginning 
with the next spacecraft, a contingent from the launch crew would 
work at the factory (McDonnell Douglas in St. Louis) to check out the 
spacecraft there. When it arrived at the Cape, it would be ready to be 
mated with its Titan II, have the pyrotechnics installed, and be 
launched. Only in this way could one hope to achieve the three-
month launch cycle planned for Gemini. 
The new system delayed the arrival of the second Gemini 
spacecraft at the Cape. There the curse set in. Once on the pad the 
spacecraft was struck by lightning, threatened by not one but two 
hurricanes, and forced to undergo check after check. And when 
launch day finally came in December, the engines ignited and then 
shut down. More rework. Finally on 19 January 1965, Gemini 2 rose 
from the launch pad on the tail of almost colorless flame from Titan 
II's hypergolic propellants, and in a 19-minute flight confirmed the 
readiness of a fully equipp~d Gemini spacecraft and the integrity of 
the heatshield during reentry. Gemini was man-rated. 
The final test flight, a manned, three-orbit qualification flight, 
was conducted on 23 March without incident. Now the diversified 
flight program could continue. One program objective was to orbit 
men in space for at least the week that it would take an Apollo flight to 
go to the moon, land, and return. Gemini 4 (3-7 June) stayed aloft four 
days; Gemini 5 (21-29 August) doubled that time and surpassed the 
Soviet long-duration record; Gemini 7 (4-18 December) provided the 
clincher with 14 days (330 hours 35 minutes). Of more lasting 
importance than the durability of the equipment was the encourag-
ing medical news that no long-term harmful effects were found from 
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extended exposure to weightlessness. There were temporary effects, 
of course: heartbeat slowed down, blood tended to pool in the legs, 
the bones lost calcium, etc., but these conditions tended to stabilize 
after a few days in weightlessness and to return to normal after a few 
days back on Earth. So far there seemed to be no physiological time 
limit for man living in space. 
A crucial question for Apollo was whether the three rendezvous 
and docking maneuvers planned for every lunar flight were feasible . 
Gemini 3 made the tentative beginning by testing the new thruster 
rockets with short-burst firings that changed the height and shape of 
orbit, and one maneuver that for the first time shifted the plane of the 
flight path of a spacecraft. Gemini 4 tried to rejoin its discarded 
second-stage booster but faulty techniques burned up too much 
maneuvering fuel and the pursuit had to be abandoned-a valuable 
lesson; back to the computers for better techniques! Gemini 5 tested 
out the techniques and verified the performance of the rendezvous 
radar and rendezvous display in the cockpit. 
Then carne what is still referred to by NASA control room 
people with pride but also with slight shudders as "Gemini 76." The 
original mission plan called for a target Agena stage to be placed in 
orbit and for Gemini to launch in pursuit of it. But the Agena fell 
short of orbit and splashed into the Atlantic. The Gemini spacecraft 
suddenly had no mission. Round-the-clock debate and recomputa-
tion produced a seemingly bizarre solution, which within three days 
of the Agena failure was approved by Administrator Webb and 
President Johnson: remove the Gemini 6 spacecraft-launch vehicle 
combination intact from the launch pad and store it carefuUy to 
preserve the integrity of checkout; erect Gemini 7 on the launch pad, 
check it out and launch it; bring Gemini 6 out and launch it to 
rendezvous with the long-duration Gemini 7. And it happened. 
Gemini 7 was launched 4 December 1965; Gemini 6 was back on the 
pad for launch by 12 December. On launch day the engines ignited, 
burned for four seconds, shut off automatically when a trouble light 
lit up . On top of the fueled booster Astronaut Walter M. Schirra,Jr., 
sat with his hand on the lanyard of the ejection seat while the control 
room checked out the condition of the fueled booster. But the 
potential bomb did not explode. On 15 December Gemini 6 lifted off 
to join its sister ship in orbit. On his fourth orbit Schirra caught up to 
Gemini 7 and maneuvered to within 10 meters; in subsequent 
maneuvers he moved to within 30 centimeters. Rendezvous was 
feasible. Was docking? 
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On 16 March 1966, Gemini 8 on its third orbit docked with ltS 
Agena target. Docking too was feasible, though in this case not for 
long. Less than half an hour after docking for an intended full night 
in the docked position, the two spacecraft unaccountably began to 
spin, faster and faster. Astronaut Neil A. Armstrong could not 
stabilize the joined spacecraft, so he fired his Gemini thrusters to 
undock and maneuver away from the Agena. Still he could not 
control his single spacecraft with the thrusters; lives seemed in 
jeopardy. Finally he fired the reentry rockets, which did the job. By 
then ground control had figured out that one thruster had stuck in 
the firing position. Armstrong made an emergency landing off 
Okinawa. Despite hardware problems, docking had been estab-
lished as feasible. 
Rendezvous was new and difficult, so experimentation con-
tinued. Gemini 9 (3- 6 June 1966) tried three kinds of rendezvous 
maneuvers with a special target stage as its passive partner, but 
docking was not possible because the shroud covering the target's 
docking mechanism had not separated. The shroud did not prevent 
simulation of an Apollo lunar orbit rendezvous. Gemini 10 (18-21 
July 1966) did dock with its Agena target and used the powerful 
Agena engine to soar to a height of 766 kilometers, the highest in 
space man had ventured. It rendezvoused with the derelict Agena 
left in orbit by Gemini 8 four months earlier, using only optical 
methods and thereby demonstrating the feasibility of rendezvous 
with passive satellites for purposes of repairing them. On the next 
flight Gemini 11 caught up with its target in its first orbit, demonstrat-
ing the possibility of quick rendezvous if necessary for rescue or 
other reasons. Each astronaut practiced docking twice. Using Agena 
propulsion, they rocketed Out to 1372 kilometers above the earth, 
another record. The final Gemini flight, Gemini 12 (11 November 
1966) rendezvoused with its target Agena on the third orbit and kept 
station with it. 
Would astronauts be able to perform useful work outside their 
spacecraft when in orbit or on the moon? This was the question 
extravehicular activity (EVA) was designed to answer. The answers 
proved to be various and more difficult than had been envisioned. 
Gemini 4 began EVA when Edward H. White II floated outside 
his spacecraft for 23 minutes. Protected by his spacesuit and attached 
to Gemini by an eight-meter umbilical cord, White used a hand-held 
maneuvering unit to move about, took photographs, and in general 
had such an exhilarating experience that he had to be ordered back 
This photo looks out Gemini II 's window at the Agena rocket with which the Gemini 
crew is practicing rendezvous and tethered stationkeeping. 
into the spacecraft. Because he had no specific work tasks to perform, 
his EVA seemed deceptively easy. 
That illusion was rudely shattered by the experience of Gemini 9, 
when Eugene A. Cernan spent two hours in EVA; he had tasks to 
perform in several areas on the spacecraft. His major assignment was 
to go behind the spacecraft into the adapter area, put on the 75-
kilogram astronaut maneuvering unit-a more powerful individual 
flight propulsion system the Air Force had built-and try it out. The 
effort to get the unit harnessed to his back was so intense that 
excessive perspiration within his spacesuit overtaxed the system and 
fogged his visor. The experiment was abandoned and he was 
ordered back into the spacecraft. 
Much more pleasant was the experience of Michael Collins on 
Gemini 10. He tried two kinds of EVA: the first time he stood in the 
open hatch for 45 minutes and made visual observations and took 
pictures; the second time he went out on a lO-meter tether, 
maneuvered for 55 minutes with the hand-held maneuvering unit 
and even propelled himself over to the station-keeping Agena 
and removed a micrometeoroid-impact experiment which had been 
in space for four months. 
L _________________ _ 
America's first space walk.. Astronaut Edward H. White II fired short bursts with his 
hand-held maneuvering gun to move around in the zero g of space before returning to the 
Gemini 4 spacecraft. 
But reality raised its ugly head again during Gemini 11 when 
Richard F. Gordon, Jr., was assigned a full schedule of work tasks 
along the spacecraft but had to terminate after 33 minutes because of 
fatigue . He had battled himself to exhaustion trying to control his 
bodily movements and fight against the opposite torque that any 
simple motion set in train. It was Isaac Newton's Third Law of 
Motion in pure form. 
NASA had learned its lesson. When Gemini 12 went up, many 
additional body restraints and hand- and footholds had been added. 
Astronauts had trained for the strange floating sensation by doing 
the same assignments in water tanks on Earth. Results were 
gratifying; in a 2-hour 6-minute tethered EVA (aside from two 
standup EVAs) Edwin E. Aldrin, Jr., successfully performed 19 
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separate tasks. Total EVA on this flight added up to 5 hours 28 
minutes. 
On the last seven flights, Gemini experimented with the 
aerodynamic lift of the spacecraft to ensure pinpoint landings on the 
earth's surface; with the dispersions possible when Apollo came in 
from 370000 kilometers away, tired astronauts would need this. The 
inertial guidance system provided inputs to the computer, which 
solved the guidance equations. On flights 6-10 the reentry was 
controlled by the crew. On the last two flights the data were fed into 
the automatic system. Results were promising. The average naviga-
tional accuracy of the seven flights was within 3 kilometers of the 
aiming point, much better than previous flights . 
Gemini was primarily a technological learning experience. So it 
is not surprising that of the 52 experiments in the program, more 
than half-27 -were technological, exploring the limits of the 
equipment. But there were also 17 scientific experiments and 8 
medical ones. An important one was the 1400 color photographs 
taken of Earth from various altitudes. This provided the investigators 
the first large corpus of color photographs from which to learn more 
about the planet we live on. 
Probably the most valuable management payoff from Gemini 
was the operational one: how to live and maneuver in space; next was 
how to handle a variety of situations in space by exploiting the 
versatility and depth of the vast NASA-contractor team that stood by 
during flights. Finally there were valuable fiscal lessons: an advanced 
technology program had a "best path" between too slow and too fast. 
Deviation on either side, as had occurred in the early days of Gemini, 
could cost appalling amounts of money. But once on track, even 
economies were possible. Once Gemini flights were on track, for 
example, Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight George 
E. Mueller (successor to Holmes) had won agreement from his 
principal contractors to cut the three-month period between launches 
to two months. This was primarily to get Gemini out of the way 
before Apollo launches started, but it paid off financially, too; where 
total program costs for Gemini were estimated in FY 1964 to be $1.35 
billion, the actual cost closed out at $1.29 billion. 
This, then, was Gemini, a versatile, flexible spacecraft system 
that wound up exploring many more nooks and crannies of 
spaceflight than its originators ever foresaw-which is as it should be. 
MtY0r lessons were transmitted to Apollo: rendezvous, yes; docking, 
yes; EVA, yes; manned flights up to two weeks in duration, yes . 
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Equally important, there was now a big experience factor for the 
astronauts and for the people on the ground, in the control room, 
around the tracking network, in industry. The system had proved 
itself in the pit; it had evolved a total team that had solved real-time 
problems in space with men's lives at stake. This was no mean legacy 
to Apollo. 
Some of the technological payoff had come too late. With the 
increasing sophistication of Gemini and the consequent slippage of 
both financial and engineering schedules, the Apollo designers and 
engineers sometimes had to invent their own wheel. But the state of 
the art had been advanced: thrusters, fuel cells, environmental 
control systems, space navigation, spacesuits, etc. In the develop-
ment stage of Apollo the bank of knowledge from Gemini paid off in 
hundreds of subtle ways. The bridge had been built. 
Throughout Gemini's operational period, Apollo was slogging 
along toward completed stages and completed spacecraft. Saturn I, 
the booster almost overtaken by events, finished its 10-flight 
program in 1964 and 1965 with six launches featuring a liquid-
hydrogen second stage. Not only was it proved out; the clustered-
engine concept was demonstrated and an early form of Apollo 
guidance was tested. The last four flights were considered opera-
tional; one (18 September 1964) tested a boilerplate Apollo space-
craft. The Last three carried Pegasus meteoroid-detection satellites 
into orbit. The last two Saturn Is were fabricated entirely by industry, 
marking a transition from the Army-arsenal in-house concept that 
had previously characterized the Marshall Space Flight Center. Ten 
Launches, ten successes. 
Meanwhile the larger brother, the Saturn lB, was being born. Its 
first stage was to generate 7100 kilonewtons of thrust, from eight of 
the H-1 engines that had powered Atlas and Saturn I, but up rated to 
890 kilonewtons each. The second stage was to feature the new J-2 
liquid hydrogen engine, generating 890 kilonewtons of thrust. It was 
a crucial element of the forthcoming Saturn V vehicle, since in a five-
engine cluster it would power the second stage and a single J-2 would 
power the third stage. 
Saturn lB was the first launch vehicle to be affected by a new 
concept, "all-up" testing. Associate Administrator Mueller, pressed 
by budgetary constraints and relying on his industry experience in 
the Air Force's Minuteman ballistic missile program, pressed NASA 
to abandon its stage-by-stage testing. With intensive ground testing 
of components, he argued, NASA could with reasonable confidence 
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test the entire stack of stages in flight from the beginning, at great 
savings to budget and schedule. Marshall engineers had built their 
splendid success record by being conservative; they vigorously 
opposed the new concept. But eventually Mueller triumphed. On 26 
February 1966, the complete Saturn IB flew with the Apollo 
command and service module in suborbital flight; the payload was 
recovered in good condition. On 5 July the IB second stage, the 
instrument unit-which would house the electronic and guidance 
brains of the Saturn V -and the nose cone were propelled into orbit. 
The total payload was 28 332 kilograms, the heaviest the U.S. had yet 
orbited. On 26 August a suborbital launch qualified the Apollo 
command module for manned flight; the attached service module 
fired its engine four times; and an accelerated reentry trajectory 
tested the Apollo heatsh ield at the 40 000-kilometer-per-hour veloc-
ity of a spacecraft returning from lunar distance. 
The largest brother, Saturn V, was still being pieced together. 
Developed by three different contractors, the three stages of Saturn V 
had individual histories and problems. The first stage, although the 
largest, had a long lead time and was on schedule. The third stage, 
though enlarged and sophisticated from the version flown on Saturn 
IB, had a previous history. It was the second stage that was the newest 
beast-five J-2 engines burning liquid hydrogen. It became the 
pacing item of the Saturn V and would remain so almost until the first 
launch. 
Of the three spacecraft, the lunar module was, early and late, the 
problem child. For one thing, it was begun late-a whole year late. 
For another, it differed radically from previous spacecraft. There 
were two discrete spacecraft within the lunar module; one would 
descend to the lunar surface from lunar orbit; the other would 
separate from the descent stage and leap off the lunar surface into 
lunar orbit and rendezvous with the command module. The engine 
for each stage would have to work perfectly for that one time it fired. 
Both had teething troubles. The descent engine was particularly 
troublesome, to the point that a second contract was let for a backup 
engine of different design. Weight was a never-ending problem with 
the LM. Each small change in a system, each substitution of one 
material for another, had to be considered as much in terms of 
kilograms added or saved as in any gain in system efficiency. 
By the end of 1966, the Saturn IB and the block I Apollo 
command and service module were considered man-rated. 
On 27 January 1967, AS-204, to be the first manned spaceflight, 
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was on the launch pad at Cape Kennedy, moving through preflight 
tests. Astronauts Virgil!. Grissom, Edward H . White II, and Roger B. 
Chaffee were suited up in the command module, moving through 
the countdown toward a simulated launch. At T-minus-lO minutes 
tragedy struck without warning. As Maj. Gen. Samuel C. Phillips, 
Apollo program director, described it the next day: "The facts briefly 
are: at 6:31 p.m. (EST) the observers heard a report which originated 
The seared Apollo command module in which three astronauts lost their lives stands in 
mute desolation at Cape Canaveral. 
" 
--7 . . ...;..- --
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from one of the crewmen that there was a fire aboard the spacecraft .. 
. ." Ground crew members saw a flash fire break through the 
spacecraft shell and envelop the spacecraft in smoke, Phillips said. 
Rescue attempts failed. It took a tortuous five minutes to get the 
hatch open from the outside. Long before that the three astronauts 
were dead from asphyxiation. It was the first fatal accident in the 
American spaceflight program. 
Shock swept across the nation and the world. In the White 
House, President Johnson had just presided over the signing of an 
international space law treaty when Administrator Webb phoned 
with the crushing news. Webb said the next day: "We've always 
known that something like this would happen sooner or later ... who 
would have thought the first tragedy would be on the ground?" 
Who, indeed? What had happened? How had it happened? 
Could it happen again? Was someone at fault? If so, who? There 
were many questions, few answers. The day following the fire, 
Deputy Administrator Seamans appointed an eight-member review 
board to investigate the accident. As chairman he chose Floyd L. 
Thompson, the veteran director of the Langley Research Center. For 
months the board probed the evidence, heard witnesses, studied 
documentation. On 10 April Webb, Seamans, Mueller, and Thomp-
son briefed the House space committee on the findings: the fire had 
apparently been started by an electrical short circuit which ignited 
the oxygen-rich atmosphere and fed on combustible materials in the 
spacecraft. The precise wire at fault could probably never be 
determined. Like most accidents it should not have happened. There 
had been errors in design, faults in testing procedures. But the basic 
spacecraft design was sound. A thorough review of spacecraft design, 
wiring, combustible materials, test procedures, etc., was under way. 
Congress was not satisfied. Hearings in both houses continued, 
gradually eroding Webb's support on Capitol Hill. 
The block I spacecraft would not be used for any manned 
flights. The hatch on the block II spacecraft would be redesigned for 
quick opening. The hundreds of miles of wiring in the spacecraft were 
checked for fire-proofing, protection against damage, etc. An 
intensive materials research program devised substitute materials 
for combustible ones. In effect the block II spacecraft was completely 
redesigned and rebuilt. The cost: 18 months delay in the manned 
flight schedule and at least $50 million. The gain: a sounder, safer 
spacecraft. 
Well before men flew in Apollo spacecraft the question had 
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been raised as to what, if anything, NASA proposed to do with men 
in space after Apollo was over. With the long lead times and heavy 
costs inherent in manned space programs, advance planning was 
essential. President Johnson proposed the question to Webb in a 
letter on 30 January 1964. NASA's first-look answer surfaced in 
congressional hearings on the FY 1965 budget. Funds were requested 
for study contracts that would investigate a variety of ideas for doing 
new things in space with the expensively acquired Apollo hardware. 
Possibilities: long-duration Earth-orbital operations, lunar surface 
exploration operating out of an unmanned Apollo lunar module 
landed on the moon, long-duration lunar orbital missions to survey 
and map the moon, Earth-orbital operations leading to space 
stations. 
Through 1965 and 1966 the studies intensified and options 
were fleshed out. The Woods Hole conference in the summer of 
1965 brought together a broad spectrum of the American science 
community and identified some 150 scientific experiments that were 
candidates for such missions. By 1966 there was a sense of urgency in 
NASA planning; the Apollo production line was peaking and would 
begin to decline in a year or two. Unless firm requirements for 
additional boosters, spacecraft, and other systems could be deline-
ated and funded soon, the production lines would shut down and the 
hard-won Apollo skills dispersed. In the FY 1967 congressional 
hearings, NASA presented further details and fixed the next fiscal 
year as the latest that hardware commitments could be deferred if the 
Apollo production line was to be used. 
NASA went into the FY 1968 budget cycle with a fairly ambitious 
Apollo Applications proposal. It asked for an FY 1968 appropriation 
of $626 million as the down payment on six Saturn IBs, six Saturn Vs, 
and eight Apollo spacecraft per year. The Bureau of the Budget 
approved a budget request of $454 million. This cut the program by 
one-third. Congress appropriated only $253 million, so by mid-
1968 the plan was down to only two additional Saturn IBs and one 
orbital workshop, with it and its Apollo telescope mount being 
deferred to 1971. 
Manned spaceflight, with its overwhelming priority, had had 
both direct and indirect impact on the NASA space science program. 
From 1958 to 1963, scientific satellites had made impressive 
discoveries: the Van Allen radiation belts, Earth 's magnetosphere, 
the existence of the solar wind. Much of the space science effort in the 
next four years had been directed toward finding more detailed data 
[ 
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on these extensive phenomena. The radiation belts were found to be 
indeed plural, with definite if shifting altitudes. The magnetosphere 
was found to have an elongated tail reaching out beyond the moon 
and through which the moon periodically passes. The solar wind was 
shown to vary greatly in intensity with solar activity. 
All of these were momentous discoveries about our nearby 
space environment. The first wave of discoveries said one thing to 
NASA: if you put up bigger, more sophisticated, more versatile 
satellites than those of the first generation, you will find many other 
unsuspected phenomena that might help unravel the history of the 
solar system, the universe, and the cosmic mystery of how it all 
works. So a second generation of spacecraft was planned and 
developed; they were called observatory class - five to ten times as 
heavy as early satellites, built around a standard bus instrumented 
for a specific scientific discipline, but designed to support up to 20 
discrete experimental instruments that could be varied from one 
Surveyor 7, perched on the lunar surface in the highlands about 29 kilometers north of 
the big crater Tycho, took the photographs in this panoramic mosaic of the area around its 
landing site. In the center of the picture the rolling horizon is about 13 kilometers dis tant,' 
the 1. 5-meter crater in the foreground is about 5 meters away. 
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flight to the next-solar observatories, astronomical observatories, 
geophysical observatories. As these complex spacecraft were devel-
oped and launched in the mid-1960s, the first results were on the 
whole disappointing. The promise was confirmed by fleeting results, 
but their very complexity inflicted them with short lifetimes and 
electrical failures. There were solid expectations that these could be 
worked out for subsequent launches. But by the late 1960s the 
impingement of manned spaceflight budgets on space science 
budgets reduced or eliminated many of these promising starts. 
Smaller satellites, such as the Pioneer series, survived and made 
valuable observations, measuring the solar wind, solar plasma 
tongues, and the interplanetary magnetic field . 
Lunar programs fared somewhat better but did not come away 
unscathed. The lunar missions were now in support of Apollo, so 
they were allowed to run their course. Surveyor softlanded six out of 
its seven spacecraft on the moon from 1966 through 1968. Its 
television cameras gave Earthlings their first limited previews of 
Lunar Orbiter 2 appears in this telephoto shot to be inside the huge lunar crater 
Copernicus. The mountains in the center of the crater rise 300 meters above the flatfloor, 
as does the rim. Distance across this part of the crater is about 27 kilometers. 
Mariner 4, at a slant range of 1250 kilometers, took this photo of Mare Cimmerium on 
Mars. With craters pockmarked try newer craters, Mars looked depressingly like the moon. 
ghostly lunar landscapes seen from the surface level. Its instruments 
showed that lunar soil was the consistency of wet sand, firm enough 
to support lunar landings by the LM. Lunar Orbiter put mapping 
cameras in orbit around the moon in all of its five missions, 
photographed over 90% of the lunar surface, including the invisible 
back side, and surveyed potential Apollo landing sites. 
Planetary programs suffered heavy cuts. The Mariner series was 
cut back, but its two flights provided exciting new glimpses into the 
history of the solar system. Mariner 4 flew past Mars on 14 July 1965 
and gave man his first close-up view of Earth 's fabled neighbor. At 
first glance the view was disappointing. Mars was battered by meteor 
impacts almost as much as the moon. While there were no magnetic 
fields or radiation belts, there was a thin atmosphere. Mariner 5 flew 
past Venus on 19 October 1967; this second pass at mysterious 
Venus found no magnetic field but an ionosphere that deflected the 
solar wind . The atmosphere was dense and very hot; temperatures 
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were recorded as high as 700 K, with 80% of the atmosphere being 
carbon dioxide. But the immediate future of more sophisticated 
planetary exploration seemed bleak. The ambitious Voyager pro-
gram was curtailed in FY 1966, fiqally dropped in FY 1968; it 
envisioned large planetary spacecraft launched on Saturn V which 
would deploy Mars entry capsules weighing 2270 to 3180 kilograms. 
The applications satellites had been a crowning achievement for 
NASA in the early 1960s. The NASA policy of bringing a satellite 
system along through the research and development stages to flight 
demonstration of the system and then turning it over to someone 
else to convert into an operational system received its acid test in 
1962. With the demonstration of Syncom performance, the commer-
cial potential of communications satellites became obvious and 
immediate. NASA's R&D role seemed over, but how should the 
valuable potential be transferred to private ownership without 
favoritism? The Kennedy administration's answer was the Com-
munications Satellite Corporation, a unique government-industry-
international combination. The board of directors would be made 
up of six named by the communications industry, six by public 
stockholders, and three named by the President of the United States. 
The corporation would be empowered to invite other nations to 
share the investment, the services, and the profits. This precedent-
setting proposal stirred strong political emotions, especially in the 
Senate. A 20-day debate ensued, including a filibuster, the time-
honored last resort in cases of deeply divisive issues , before the 
administration proposal was approved. On 31 August 1962, Presi-
dent Kennedy signed the bill into law. ComSatCorp, as it came to be 
called, set up in business. On 6 April 1965, its first satellite, Early Bird 
1, was launched into synchronous orbit by NASA on a reimbursable 
basis. By the end of 1968, there was an Intelsat network of five 
communications satellites in synchronous orbits, some 20 of an 
expected 40 ground stations in operation, and 48 member nations 
participating. The Soviets had mounted a competitive system of 
Molniya satellites with first launch in 1965. They· too had sought 
international partnership, but only France outside of the Iron 
Curtain countries signed up. By 1968 they had launched 10 Molniya 
satellites into their standard elliptical orbit. On the American side, 
the question of government-sponsored research on communications 
satellites was not completely solved by the creation of ComSatCorp. 
Congress continued to worry over the thorny question of whether 
the government should carry on advanced research on communica-
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tions satellites versus the prospect that a government-sponsored 
monopoly would profit from the results . 
Weather satellites were simpler in the sense that the relationship 
was confined to two government agencies. The highly successful 
Tiros was seized on by the Weather Bureau as the model for its 
operational satellite series. NASA had high hopes for its follow-on 
Nimbus satellite, bigger, with more instruments measuring more 
parameters. The Weather Bureau, however, felt that unless NASA 
could guarantee a long operational lifetime for Nimbus, it was too 
expensive for routine use. So NASA continued Nimbus as a test bed 
for advanced sensors that could provide better measurements of the 
vertical structure of the atmosphere and global collection of weather 
data. 
Navigational satellites, one of the early bright possibilities of 
space, continued to be intractable. But there was a new entry, the 
Earth resources satellite. Impressed by the Tiros photographs and 
even more by the Gemini photographs, the Department of Interior 
suggested an Earth resources satellite program in 1966. Early NASA 
investigation envisioned a small, low-altitude satellite in sun-
synchronous orbit. What could be effectively measured with existing 
sensors, to what degree, with what frequency, in what priority? These 
questions involved an increasing number of government agencies. 
Then there was the complex question of what trade-off was best 
between aircraft-borne sensors and satellite-borne ones . It was a new 
kind of program for NASA, involving many more government 
agencies and many more political sensitivities than the uncluttered 
researches in space. 
The advanced research activities of NASA also became more 
subtle and difficult to track. An interlocking network of basic 
research and applied research, advanced research was designed to 
feed new ideas and options into the planning process. The most 
visible portion was flight research. The X-15 had culminated the 
series of Air Force-NASA research aircraft with a glittering series of 
speed and altitude records and a very solid base of aerodynamic data. 
The prototype B-70 had been turned over to NASA for research in 
large aircraft flying at supersonic speeds. 
When the political question arose as to whether the United 
States should enter the international competition for a supersonic 
commercial transport aircraft-a sweepstakes already entered by 
Great Britain and France jointly with their Concorde and by the 
Soviet Union with its TU-J44-NASA already had a solid data base 
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to contribute. It also had the laboratories and the contracting base to 
manage the program. But wise counsel from Deputy Administrator 
Dryden led to NASA's retreat into a supportive R&D role; he argued 
that with Apollo under way, NASA could not politically sponsor 
another high-technology, enormously expensive program in the 
same budget years without one of them being sacrificed to the other 
or killing each other off in competition for funds. The subsequent 
history of the supersonic transport program, including its eventual 
demise, was eloquent testimonial to the wisdom of his judgment. His 
death in December 1965 was a loss to the nation. 
Another visible area of advanced research was the study of 
hydroplaning, the dangerous tendency of aircraft, when landing, to 
lose braking control on wet or slushy runways. Research done at 
Langley indicated that the wheels tended to float on top of the water 
surface; grooving the concrete would drain water and provide much 
greater traction. Quickly and successfully applied to runways, the 
same technique soon spread to the national highway system. 
Other research efforts paid big dividends within the space 
program. Lewis Research Center had become involved in the use of 
liquid hydrogen as a rocket fuel in 1955. Although liquid hydrogen 
offered very attractive increases in thrust per kilogram as compared 
to previous fuels, hydrogen had a bad reputation left over from 
dirigible days and the Hindenburg disaster. But by 1957 Lewis was 
successfully and routinely firing an 89-kilonewton-thrust engine 
using liquid hydrogen as fuel. It was these tests that gave NASA the 
confidence in 1959 to decide that the upper stages of the lunar rocket 
should be fueled with liquid hydrogen. Without this additional 
rocket power, it might have been impossible- or at least much more 
expensive- to put men on the moon. 
The quiet-engine program for commercial aircraft grew out of 
widespread public protest against noise levels around city airports. 
Again Lewis was the lead center; laborious research into all aspects of 
the jet engine (air inlets, turbine blades, exhaust characteristics) led 
to new possibilities that in combination would dramatically lower 
the level of noise generated by jet aircraft. 
Long-range prospects of manned planetary exploration de-
pended heavily on more efficient thrust-per-pound-of-fuel propul-
sion. To this end NASA had continued the long-range program in-
herited from the Air Force to develop a nuclear-propelled upper 
stage for a rocket. Engineering down to a compact package the 
enormous weight, size, and shielding of the kind of reactor used in 
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On.3 February 1966 the AEC-NASA Nuclear Rocket Development Station atJackass 
Flats, Nevada, fired the first complete "breadboard" nuclear rocket engine to be tested by 
the United States. It made two successful 1 5-minute test runs that day at partial power. 
nuclear electric-power plants was a severe challenge. The inevitable 
intensification of radiation density and temperatures defeated exist-
ing materials that would contain and transmit the heat to an engine. 
Time after time over the years, test firings of promising configura-
tions had to be stopped prematurely when radiation corrosion took 
its toll. Finally in December 1967 the NRX-A6 reactor ran for one 
hour at full power, twice the time achieved before. Improvements in 
reactor fuel elements cut radiation control in half. The Snap 
program of radioisotope thermoelectric generators also progressed. 
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The Snap-27 was the long-life power source for the Apollo science 
experiments to be left on the lunar surface. 
The flight-test program on lifting-body shapes for possible re-
entry configurations of future manned spacecraft got under way at 
Flight Research Center in 1964. The M-2 lifting body designed at 
Ames Research Center made 100 flights. Results indicated that a 
man could reenter the atmosphere and land safely on a runway in a 
lightweight lifting-body aircraft. Encouraged by the basic data, 
NASA ordered two more lifting bodies with different configurations-
the M-2/F-2 and the HL-I0. The M-2/F-2 made 15 successful flights 
in 1966-1967. The HL-10, after modification, made 13 flights in 
1968, 3 of them rocket powered. 
Although the tragic fire of January 1967 delayed plans for 
manned spaceflight in Apollo hardware for something like 18 
months, the versatility of the system came to the rescue. The burden 
of checking out the major components of the system was quickly 
shifted to unmanned flights while a quick-opening hatch was 
designed and tested, combustibles were sought out and replaced, 
and the wiring design was completely reworked. After a nine-month 
delay, flight tests resumed. On 9 November 1967, Apollo 4 became 
the first unmanned launch of the awesome Saturn V. A 110-meter-
high stack of three-stage launch vehicle and spacecraft, weighing 
Three lifting-body configurations grouped on the dry lake bed at Flight Research 
Center-left to right, the X-24, M-2, and HL- JO. 
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2824 tons, slowly lifted off Launch Complex 39, propelled by a first-
stage thrust of 33800 kilonewtons. A record 126529 kilograms of 
payload and upper stage were put into Earth orbit. Later the third 
stage fired to simulate lunar trajectory, lifting the spacecraft com-
bination to 17 335 kilometers. With the third stage discarded, the 
service module fired its engine to raise the apogee to 18 204 
kilometers, then burned again to propel the spacecraft toward Earth 
reentry at the 40000-kilometer-per-hour return speed from the 
moon. All systems performed well ; the third stage could restart in the 
vacuum of space; the automated Launch Complex 39 functioned 
beautifully. The once-controversial concept of "all-up" testing had 
been vindicated. 
Next came the unmanned flight test of the laggard lunar module. 
On 22 January 1968, a Saturn IB launched a 14 392-kilogram lunar 
module into Earth orbit. It separated, tested its ascent and descent 
engines. The lunar module passed its first flight test. 
Now to man-rate the huge Saturn V. Apollo 6, on 4 April 1968, 
put the launch vehicle through its paces-the stages, the guidance 
system, the electrical systems. Four of five test objectives were met; 
Saturn V was man-rated. The stage was set for the first manned space-
flight in Apollo since the tragic fire. Apollo 7 would test the crew and 
command module for the 10 days in space that would later be 
needed to fly to the moon, land, and return . 
But beyond Apollo 7, the schedule was in real difficulty. It was the 
summer of 1968; only a year and a half remained of the decade 
within which this nation had committed itself to land men on the 
moon. Somehow the flight schedule ought to be accelerated. 
Gemini 's answer had been to launch missions closer together, but 
the size and complexity of Apollo hardware severely limited that 
option . The only other possibility was to get more done on each 
flight. For a time, however, it seemed that the next flight, Apollo 8, 
would accomplish even less than had been planned. It had been 
scheduled as the first manned test of the lunar module in Earth orbit, 
but the LM had a lengthy test-and-fix roadblock ahead of it and 
could not be ready before the end of the year, and perhaps not then. 
So a repeat of Apollo 7 was considered, another test of the command 
module in Earth orbit without the tardy LM but this time on the giant 
Saturn V. Eight years earlier that would have been considered a big 
bite; now, was it big enough, given Apollo 's gargantuan task? 
In Houston, George Low didn't think it was. After all, he rea-
soned, even this test-flight hardware was built to go to the moon; why 
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not use it that way? The advantages of early experience at lunar 
distances would be enormous. On 9 August he brqached the idea to 
Gilruth, who was enthusiastic. Within days the senior managers of 
the program had been polled and had checked for problems that 
might inhibit a circumlunar flight. All problems proved to be 
fixab le, assuming that ApoLLo 7 went well. The trick then became to 
build enough flexibility into the Apollo 8 mission so that it could go 
either way, Earth-~rbital or lunar-orbital. 
Apollo 7 was launched on 11 October 1968. A Saturn IB put three 
astronauts into Earth orbit, where they stayed for eleven days, testing 
particularly the command module-environmental system, fuel 
cells, communications. All came through with flying colors. On 12 
November, NASA announced that Apollo 8 had been reconfigured to 
focus on lunar orbit. It was a bold jump. 
On 21 December a Saturn V lifted the manned Apollo 8 off 
Launch Complex 39 at the Cape. The familiar phases were repeated: 
Earth orbit, circularizing the orbit, etc. But then the Saturn third 
stage fired again and added the speed necessary for the spacecraft to 
escape Earth 's gravity on a trajectory to the moon. All the rehearsed 
or simulated steps went well. On 23 December the three-man crew 
became the first human beings to pass out of Earth's gravitational 
control and into that of another body in the solar system. No longer 
was man shackled to the near environs of Earth . The TV camera 
looked back at a small, round, rapidly receding ball, warmly laced 
with a mix of blue oceans, brown continents, and white clouds that 
was startling against the blackness of space. 
On Christmas Eve Apollo 8 disappeared behind the moon and 
out of radio communication with Earth. Not only were the astronauts 
the first humans to see the mysterious back side of the moon; while 
there they had to fire the service module engine to reduce their speed 
enough to be captured into lunar orbit-irrevocably, unless the 
engine would restart later and boost them back toward Earth. 
Another engine burn regularized their lunar orbit at 113 kilo-
meters above the surface. TV shared the breathtaking bird's-eye view 
of the battered lunar landscape with hundreds of millions on Earth. 
The crew members read the creation story from Genesis and wished 
viewers a Merry Christmas. On Christmas Day they fired the service 
module engine once again, acquired the 1 OOO-meter-per-second ad-
ditional speed needed to escape lunar gravity, and triumphantly 
headed back to Earth. They had at close range verified the lunar 
landing sites as feasible and proved out the hardware and com-
As Apollo 8 came around the backside of the moon after going into lunar orbit, the crew 
was greeted with this haunting view of the earth rising above the desolate lunar horizon. 
munications at lunar distance-except for the all-important last link, 
the lunar module. 
That last link, the lunar module, was still of major concern to 
NASA. Two more flights were expended to confirm its readiness for 
lunar landing. The Apollo 9 flight (3-13 March 1969) was the first 
manned test of the lunar module. The big Saturn V boosted the 
spacecraft combination into Earth orbit. The lunar-flight drill was 
carefully rehearsed; the command and service modules separated 
from the third stage of the Saturn V, turned around, and docked with 
the lunar module. The lunar module fired up and moved away to 
183 kilometers; then the spacecraft rendezvoused and docked. 
A final test-was anything different at lunar distance? On 18 
May 1969, Apollo 10 took off on a Saturn V to find out. The entire 
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lunar landing combination blasted out to lunar distance. Once in 
lunar orbit, the crew separated the lunar module from the command 
module, descended to within 14 kilometers of the surface, fired the 
ascent system, and docked with the command module. Now all 
systems were "gO." 
On 16 July 1969, ApoLLo 11 lifted off for the ultimate mission of 
Apollo. Saturn V performed beautifully. The spacecraft combina-
tion got off to the moon. Once in lunar orbit, the crew checked out 
Apollo II sLowLy rose off the Launchpad at Kennedy Space Center on 16JuLy 1969, as 
the Saturn V thundered aloft on the way to landing the first men on the surface oj the 
moon. 
A stronaut Neil A. A rmstrong took this plwtograph of Edwin E. A ldrin,j r., deploying the 
passive seismic experiments at Tranquility Base, while the ungainly lunar module 
crouches in the background. 
their precarious second home, the lunar module. On 20 July the LM 
separated and descended to the lunar surface. At 4: 18 p.m. (EST) 
came the word from Astronaut Neil A. Armstrong: " Houston-
Tranquility Base here-the Eagle has landed." After checkout, 
Armstrong set foot on the lunar surface-"one small step for a 
man -one giant leap for mankind. " The eight-year national commit-
ment had been fulfilled; man was on the moon. Armstrong set up the 
TV camera and watched his fellow astronaut Edwin E. Aldrin, Jr., 
join him on the lunar surface, as Michael Collins circled the moon in 
the Columbia command module overhead. More than one-fifth of the 
earth's population watched ghostly TV pictures of two space-suited 
men plodding around gingerly in an unlikely world of gray surface, 
boulders, and rounded hills in the background. The astronauts im-
planted the U.S . flag, deployed the scientific experiments to be left 
on the moon, collected their rock samples, and clambered back into 
the lunar module. The next day they blasted off in the ascent module 
and rendezvoused with the command module. 
The astronauts returned to an ecstatic reception. For a brief 
moment, man's day-to-day divisions had been suspended; the world 
watched and took joint pride in man's latest achievement in explora-
tion. Astronauts and their families made a triumphant world tour 
which restated mankind's pride in this new plateau of man's 
conquest of the cosmos. 
I 
--~ 
4 
Exploitation of Apollo 
The worldwide euphoria over mankind's greatest voyage of ex-
ploration did not rescue the NASA budget. At its moment of great-
est triumph, the space program was being drastically cut back from 
the $5-billion budgets that had characterized the mid-1960s. Part of 
the reduction was expected; the peak of Apollo production-line 
expenses was past. But the depth of the cut stemmed from emotion-
al changes in the political climate, mosdy centering on the unpopular 
Vietnam war-its sapping expenses in lives and money, the debilitat-
ing protests at home. As Congress read the public pulse, the cosmos 
could wait; the Soviet threat had for the moment been put to rest; the 
new political reality lay in domestic problems. NASA's fiscal 1970 
budget was reduced to $3.7 billion. Something had to give. The basic 
Apollo mission was continued, but the last three flights had to be 
deleted. Space science projections were hit hard. The ambitious $2-
billion Voyager program for planetary exploration dwindled into 
oblivion; it would later resurface as the much more modest Viking. 
The new Electronics Research Center in Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
under construction since 1964, was sacrificed -transferred to the 
Department of Transportation intact, a $40-million facility and 399 
of 745 skilled employees. 
But the bought-and-paid-for projects continued to earn divi-
dends. An Orbiting Astronomical Observatory (OAO 2) was launched 
7 December 1968. It was the heaviest and most complex automated 
spacecraft yet in the space science program. It took the first ultravio-
let photographs of the stars. The results were portentous: first hard 
evidence of the existence of "black holes" in space. Manner 6 and 7, 
launched in early 1969,journeyed to Mars, flew past as close as 3200 
kilometers, took 198 high-quality TV photos of the planet, 2000 
ultraviolet spectra, and 400 infrared spectra of the atmosphere and 
surface. 
Other programs continued with prepaid momentum. The fifth 
and sixth Orbiting Solar Observatories were launched in 1969, as 
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OAO 2, the orbiting astronomical obseroatory, was the largest, heaviest, and most 
complex scientifu spacecraft NASA had developed. With its solar panels deployed, as 
shown here, OAO 2 was 6.4 meters wide, weighed 2000 kilograms, and carried 11 
ultraviolet telescopes into space. 
was the sixth Orbiting Geophysical Observatory. The supercritical 
wing, product of four years of wind-tunnel research by Richard T. 
Whitcomb at Langley, was committed to fabrication for test at Flight 
Research Center. The flight tests confirmed the theoretical data; the 
current generation of transport aircraft could fly up to 160 kilometers 
per hour faster, promising significant operating economies. 
1970 saw the launch of UhUTU, which scanned 95% of the celes-
tial sphere for sources of x-rays. It discovered three new pulsar stars 
in addition to the one previously identified. In 1971 Mariner 9 was 
launched; on 10 November, the first American spacecraft went into 
orbit around another planet. The early months in orbit were discour-
aging; a gigantic dust storm covered most of the Martian surface for 
two months. But the dust gradually cleared; photographs in 1972 
showed startling detail. Mapping 85% of the Martian surface, Mariner 9 
photographs depicted higher mountains and deeper valleys than any 
on Earth. The rocky Martian moons, Deimos and Phobos, were also 
photographed. OSO 7, launched on 29 September 1971, was the first 
satellite to catch on film the beginning of a solar flare and the conse-
quent streamers of hot gases that extended out 10.6 million kilo-
meters; it would also discover "polar ice caps" on the sun- dark 
areas several million degrees cooler than the normal surface temper-
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atures. With the confirmation of black holes, the enigmatic collapsed 
star remnants so dense in mass and gravity that even light cannot 
escape, and the previous discoveries of quasars and pulsars, these 
findings added up to the most exciting decade in modern astronomy. 
Planetary exploration opened further vistas of other worlds . 
Pioneer 10, launched 2 March 1972, left the vicinity of Earth at the 
highest velocity ever achieved by a spacecraft (5 1 200 kilometers per 
hour) and took off on an epic voyage to the huge, misty planet 
Jupiter. Giant of the solar system, swathed with clouds, encircled by a 
cluster of moons, Jupiter was an inescapable target if one hoped to 
understand the composition of the solar system. Out from the sun, 
out from Earth, Pioneer 10 ventured for a year and a half, through the 
unexplored Asteroid Belt and far beyond. After a 992-million-
kilometer journey, on 3 December 1973 the tiny spacecraft flew past 
Jupiter. It survived the fierce magnetic field and sent back photo-
graphs of the huge planet and several of its moons, measured tem-
peratures and radiation and the magnetic field. Steadily sailing past 
As the great dust storm on Mars cleared, the circling Mariner 9 photographed this giant 
mountain. Some 500 kilometers across at the base and rising to a height estimated to be 
25 kilometers, Olympus Mons dwarfs any mountain on Earth. 
jupiter, as pfwtographed by Pioneer 10 from 2.5 million kilometers out. The large black 
oval to the left is the Jamous Great Red Spot, an enormous storm that has raged for at 
least hundreds oj years. The small spot to the right is the shadow of jupiter's moon 10. 
Jupiter and away from the sun, in 1987 Pioneer 10 would cross the 
orbit of Pluto; becoming the first man-made object to travel out of 
our solar system and into the limitless reaches of interstellar space. 
Pioneer lO's partner, Pioneer I I, took off on 5 April 1973 to follow 
the same outward path. On 3 December 1974 it passedJupiter at the 
perilously close distance of 42 000 kilometers-as 'opposed to 
129000 kilometers for Pioneer 1 O-and returned data. The composite 
picture from the reports of the two spacecraft depicted an enormous 
ball of hydrogen, with no fixed surface, emitting much more 
radiation than it received from the sun, shrouded with a turbulent 
atmosphere in which massive storms such as the Great Red Spot 
(40000 kilometers in length) had raged for at least the 400 years since 
Galileo first trained a telescope atJupiter. Pioneer 11 swung around 
the planet and, taking advantage of Jupiter's gravitational field, ac-
celerated outward at 106 000 kilometers per hour toward the distant 
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planet Saturn, where in 1979 it would observe at close range this 
lightest of the planets (it could float on water), its mysterious rings, 
and its 4800-kilometer-diameter moon Titan. 
Going in the other direction, Mariner 10 left Earth on 3 Novem-
ber 1973, headed inward toward the sun. In February 1974 it passed 
Venus, gathering information that confirmed the inhospitable 
character of that planet. Then, using Venus's gravitational force as 
propulsion, it charged on toward the innermost planet, Mercury. On 
29 March 1974, Mariner 10 flew past Mercury, providing man a 5000-
times closer look at this desolate, crater-pocked, sun-seared planet 
than had been possi ble from Earth. Using the gravitational field of its 
Venus was photographed from 720000 kilometers by Mariner 10. 
L 
A large, .fresh impact crater on Mercury was photographed by Mariner 10 .from 34 000 
kiLometers. The crater, 120 kilometers across, Looks simiLar to many on the moon, but 
because Mercury has a gravitationaL fzeld 2.3 times as strong as the moon's, materiaL 
ejected at impact is not hurled nearly as far on Mercury. 
host planet to alter course, Mariner 10 flew out in a large elliptical 
orbit, circled back by Mercury a second time on 21 September 1974, 
and a third time on 16 March 1975. The cumulative evidence 
pictured a planet essentially unchanged since its creation some 4.5 
billion years ago, except for heavy bombardment by meteors, with 
an iron core similar to Earth's, a thin atmosphere composed mostly 
of helium, and a weak magnetic field. 
Fascinating as was the information on our fellow-voyagers in the 
solar system and as important as the long-range scientific import 
might be, Congress and many government agencies were much 
more intrigued with the tangible, immediate-return, Earth-oriented 
program that began operations in 1972. On 23 July ERTS 1 (Earth 
Resources Technology Satellite) was launched into polar orbit. From 
that orbit it would cover three-quarters of the earth's land surface 
every 18 days, at the same time of day (and therefore with the same 
sun angle for photography), affording virtually global real-time 
information on developing events such as crop inventory and health, 
water storage, air and water pollution, forest fires and diseases, and 
A HISTORY OF NACA A 0 NASA , 19 15- 1980 77 
recent urban population changes . In addition it depicted the broad-
area- and therefore undetectable by ground surveyor aircraft 
reconnaissance-geologic patterns and coastal and oceanic move-
ments. ERTS 1 also interrogated hundreds of ground sensors 
monitoring air and water pollution, water temperature and currents, 
snow depth, etc., and relayed information to central collection 
centers in near real-time. The response was instantaneous and 
widespread; foreign governments, states, local governments, univer-
sities, and a broad range of industrial concerns quickly became 
involved in both the exploration of techniques to exploit these new 
ERTS (Earth Resources Technology Satellite) photograph of the Washington-Baltimore 
area in October 19 72. Green, red, and infrared images from the satellite were combined 
at Goddard Space Flight Center. Healthy crops and trees come out bright red in the 
infTared. Cities and industrial areas show as green or dark gray,' clear water is black or 
dark blue. Washington is to be seen slightly left of center on the Potomac River,' Baltimore 
is at the top center on Chesapeake Bay. 
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wide-area information sources and in real-time use of the data for 
pressing governmental and industrial needs. Some 300 national and 
international research teams pored over the imagery. For the first 
time accurate estimates were possible of the total planting and 
growth status of wheat, barley, corn, and rice crops at various times 
during the growing season; real-time maps versus ones based on data 
that would have been collected over a period of years; timber cutting 
patterns; accurate prediction of snow run-offforwater management; 
accurate, real-time flood damage reports. Mid-term data included 
indications that the encroachments of the Sahara Desert in Africa 
could be reversed by controlled grazing on the sparse vegetation in 
the fringe areas; longer range returns suggested promise in monitor-
ing strip mining and subsequent reclamation and in identification of 
previously unknown extensions of Earth faults and fractures impor-
tant to detection of potential earthquake zones and of associated 
mineral deposits. 
Like the experimental communications satellites of the early 
1960s, the Earth-resources satellites found an immediate clientele of 
governmental and commercial customers clamoring for a continu-
ing inflow of data. The pressure made itselffelt in Congress; on 22Jan-
uary 1975, Landsat 2 (formerly ERTS 2) was orbited ahead of schedule 
to ensure continuation of the data that ERTS I (renamed Landsat 1) 
had provided for two and a half years, and a third satellite was 
programmed for launch in 1977. This would give confidence to 
experimental users of the new system that they could securely plan 
for continued information from the satellite system. 
The Earth-resources program had another important meaning. 
It was a visible sign that the nature and objectives of the space 
program were undergoing a quiet but dramatic shift. Where the 
moon had been the big target during the 1960s and large and 
expensive programs had been the name of the game, it became 
increasingly clear to NASA management as the decade ended that 
the political climate would no longer support that kind of a space 
program. The key question now was, "What will this project contrib-
ute to solving everyday problems of the man-in-the-street?" One by 
one the 60s-type daydreams of big, away-from-Earth projects were 
reluctantly put aside: a manned lunar base, a manned landing on 
Mars, an unmanned "Grand Tour" of several of the planets. When 
the Space Shuttle finally won approval, it was because of its heavy 
dedication to studies of our Earth and its convincing economies in 
operation. 
Another sign of the times was that NASA was increasingly 
L 
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becoming a service agency. In 1970 NASA for the first time launched 
more satellites for others (ComSatCorp, NOAA, DoD, foreign 
governments) than for itself. Five years before only 20f24 launches 
had been for others. Clearly this trend would continue for some years. 
Meanwhile Apollo was running its impressive course. Apollo 12 
(14-24 November 1969) repeated the ApoLLo 11 adventure at another 
site on the moon, the Ocean of Storms. One attraction of that site was 
that Surveyor 3 had been squatting there for two and a half years . A 
pin-point landing put the LM within 183 meters of the Surveyor 
spacecraft. In addition to deploying scientific instruments and 
collecting rock samples from the immediate surroundings, Astronauts 
Conrad and Bean cut off pieces from Surveyor 3, including the TV 
camera, for return to Earth and analysis after 30 months of exposure 
to the lunar environment. 
Apollo 13 was launched 11 April 1970, to continue lunar explora-
tion. But 56 hours into the flight, well on the way to the moon, there 
was a thump back in the service module behind the astronauts. An 
oxygen tank had ruptured. Pressure dropped alarmingly. What was 
the total damage? Had other systems been affected? How crippled 
was the spacecraft combination? The backup analysis system on 
Earth sprang into action . Using the meager data available, crews at 
contractor plants allover the country simulated, calculated, and 
reported. The verdict: Apollo 13 was seriously, perhaps mortally, 
wounded. There was not air or water or electricity to sustain three 
men on the shortest possible return path to Earth. But, ground crews 
and astronauts asked simultaneously, what about the lunar module, 
a self-contained spacecraft unaffected by the disaster? The lunar 
landing was out of the question anyway; the lifesaving question was 
how to get three men around the moon and back to Earth before 
their life-supporting consumables ran out. Could the LM substitute 
for the command module, supplying propulsion and oxygen and 
water for an austere return trip? The simulations said yes. Apollo 13 
was reprogrammed to loop around the moon and set an emergency 
course for Earth return. The descent engine for the LM responded 
nobly; off they went back to Earth. It was a near thing- powered 
down to the point of minimum heating and communication, 
limiting activity to the least possible to save oxygen. Again the 
flexibility and depth of the system came to the rescue; when reentry 
was safely within the limited capabilities of the crippled Apollo, the 
"lifeboat" LM was fondly jettisoned along with the wounded service 
module. Apollo 13 reentered safely. 
The next flight was delayed while the causes and fixes for the 
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near-tragedy on Apollo 13 were soned out. On 31 January 1971, Apollo 14 
lifted off, the beginning of the scientific exploration of the moon. 
The major new system was a transporter, a cart on which to load 
equipment and bring back rock samples. A major target of the Apollo 
14 mission to Fra Mauro was to climb the walls of the Cone Crater; 
the attempt failed near the top when the walls turned out to be 
steeper than anticipated. 
Apollo 15 introduced the moon car, the lunar rover. With this 
ele.ctric-powered, four-wheel drive vehicle developed at Marshall at a 
cost of $60 million, the astronauts roamed beyond the narrow 
confines of their landing site and explored the area. Astronauts on 
this flight covered 28 kilometers oflunar surface, visited a number of 
craters in the Hadley-Apennines area, and photographed the ghostly 
ravine Hadley Rille. Thanks to the lowered exertion level because of 
the lunar rover, exploration time was doubled. 
The remaining Apollo missions now had all the equipment 
Apollo 15 AstroMut David R. Scott was photographed by the lUMr rover, which was 
parked at the edge of the deep lUMr trench Hadley Rille. 
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planned for lunar exploration. Apollo 16 landed in the Descartes area 
in April 1972, stayed 71 hours, provided photos and measurements 
of the lunar properties. ApoLLo 17, launched 7 December 1972, ended 
the Apollo program with the most productive scientific mission of 
the lunar exploration program. The site, Taurus-Littrow, had been 
selected on the basis of previous flights. Objectives were to seek out 
both oldest and youngest rocks to fill in the geologic history of the 
moon. For the first time a trained geologist, Harrison H. Schmitt, 
was on a crew, adding his professional observations. EVA time was 
over 22 hours and the ' lunar rover traveled some 35 kilometers. 
Apollo was ended. From beginning to end, it had lasted 11 ~ 
years, cost $23.5 billion, landed 12 men on the moon, and produced 
an unassessable amount of evidence and knowledge. Technologically 
it had produced hardware systems several orders of magnitude more 
capable than their predecessors. In various combinations, the 
components of this technology could be used for a wider variety of 
explorations than the nation could possibly afford. The luxury of 
choice was, which of a half dozen possible missions? 
Scientific answers were going to be returned over several 
decades. The Lunar Receiving Laboratory had been constructed in 
Houston to be the "archive" of the 382 kilograms of physical lunar 
samples that had been returned from various parts of the moon by 
six lunar-landing crews. Scientists in this country and 54 foreign 
countries were analyzing the samples with an impressive variety of 
instruments and the expertise of many scientific disciplines. Gross 
results had already established that the moon was a separate entity 
from Earth, formed at the same time as Earth some 4.5 billion years 
ago; that it had its own volcanic history; that with no protective 
atmosphere it had been bombarded by eons of meteors from outer 
space, which had plowed up the surface and in larger impacts had 
triggered secondary lava flows from the lunar interior. Refinement of 
data would go on for decades. 
Apollo had proved many other things: the ability of our diversi-
fied system of government, industry, and universities to mobilize 
behind a common national purpose and produce on schedule an 
immense and diverse system directed to a common purpose. It not 
only argued that man could do many things in space, whether 
extended lunar exploration from permanent lunar bases or manned 
excursions to Mars, but argued that solutions to many of man's 
major problems on Earth-pollution, food supply, natural disasters 
such as earthquakes and hurricanes, etc.-could be ameliorated or 
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controlled by the combination of space technology and the large-
scale management techniques applied to it. 
Next in manned spaceflight carne SLylab. Trimmed back to one 
orbital wDrkshop and three astronaut flights, Skylab had had a hectic 
financial and planning career, the converse of Apollo . The revised 
plan called for an S-IVB stage of the Saturn V to be outfitted as a two-
story orbiting laboratory, one floor being living quarters and the 
other working room. The major objective of Sky lab was to determine 
whether men could physically withstand extended stays in space and 
continue to do useful work. Medical data from the Gemini and 
Apollo flights had not completely answered the question. Since there 
would be far more room in the 27 -meter-long orbital workshop than 
in any previous spacecraft, William C. Schneider, Skylab program 
director, devised a more extensive experiment schedule than all 
previous spaceflights combined. Most ambitious in terms of hard-
ware was the Apollo telescope mount; five major experiments would 
cover the entire range of solar physics and make it the most powerful 
astronomical observatory ever put in orbit. The other major areas of 
experimentation were Earth-resources observations and medical 
experiments involving the three-man crew. There were important 
subcategories of experiments: the electric furnace, for example, 
would explore possibilities of using the weightless environment to 
perform industrial processes that were impossible or less effective on 
I-g Earth, such as forming perfectly round ball bearings or growing 
larger crystals, much in demand in the electronics industry. 
On 14 May 1973 a giant Saturn V lifted off from Kennedy Space 
Center to place the unmdJlned 7491 O-kilogram orbital workshop in 
Earth orbit. Within minutes after launch, disquieting news filtered 
through the telemetry reports from the Saturn V. The large, delicate 
meteoroid shade on the outside of the workshop had apparently 
been torn offby the vibrations oflaunch. In tearing offit had caused 
serious damage to the two wings of solar cells that were to supply 
most of the electric power to the workshop; one of them had sheared 
off, the other was snagged in the folded position. Once the workshop 
was in orbit, the news worsened. The loss of the big shade exposed 
the metal skin of the wGrkshop to the hot sunshine; internal 
temperatures soared to 325 K. This heat not only threatened its 
habitation by astronauts, but if prolonged might fog sensitive film 
and generate poisonous gases. 
The launch of the first crew was twice postponed, while the far-
flung ground support team worked around the clock for 10 frantic 
Mission accomplished, the Skylab orbital worksfwp sails serenely above cloud-shrouded 
Earth in this pfwto taken by the last crew as they leave to return to Earth. The mission-
saving emergency shroud sfwws clearly against the dark surface of the vehicle. 
days, trying to improvise fixes that would salvage the $2.6-billion 
program. With only partial knowledge of the precise degree and 
nature of the damage, engineers had to work out fixes that met the 
known problems, yet were versatile enough to cope with unknown 
ones. There were two major efforts: first, to devise a deployable 
shade that the astronauts could spread over the metal surface of the 
workshop; the other was to devise a versatile tool kit of cutters and 
snippers to release the undeployed solar wing from whatever 
prevented it from unfolding. 
On 25 May 1973, an Apollo command and service module 
combination was lifted into orbit by a Saturn lB. Apollo docked with 
the workshop on the 25th. The crew entered it the next day and 
deployed a makeshift parasol through the solar airlock. The effect 
was immediate; internal temperature began to drop. On 7 June 
Astronauts Conrad and Kerwin clambered outside the workshop 
and after a tense struggle succeeded in cutting the metal straps that 
ensnared the remaining solar wing; it slowly deployed and electrical 
power poured into the storage batteries. Human ingenuity and 
courage had made the workshop operational again. 
The remaining Skylab missions were almost anticlimactic after 
the.dramatic rescue of the workshop. With only minor problems, the 
missions ticked off their complicated schedules of experiment. In 
spite of the initial diversion, the first crew obtained 80% of the solar 
data planned; 12 of 15 Earth-resources runs were completed; and all 
This color-density rendition oj a solar eruption was taken by Skylab's spectroheliograph. 
One oj the 10 kinds oj telescope in the Apollo telescope mount, it covered the wavelengths 
in the extreme ultraviolet, a part oj the spectrum never seen from Earth. 
of the 16 medical experiments went as planned. Its 28-day mission 
completed, the crew undocked and returned to Earth. 
The second crew was launched on 28 July 1973, completed 
almost 60 days in orbit, and exceeded by one-third the solar 
observation$ and Earth-resources runs planned . All the medical 
experiments were performed. The third crew (launched 16 Novem-
ber 1973) completed an 84-day flight with all experiments performed, 
as well as the additional observations of the surprise cosmic visitor, 
comet Kohoutek. 
The vast mass of astronomical and Earth-resources data from 
the Skylab program would take years to analyze. A more immediate 
result was apparent in the medical data and the industrial experiments. 
With the corrective exercises available on Skylab, there was no 
physiological barrier to the length of time man could survive and 
function in space. Man's biological functions did indeed stabilize 
after several weeks in zero-g. The industrial experiments gave strong 
evidence that the melting and solidification process was promisingly 
different in weightlessness; single crystals grew five times as large as 
those producible on Earth . Some high-cost industrial processes 
apparently had new potential in space. 
-- ~~ -- - ~~--- - --- - -- --' 
5 
On the Eve of Shuttle 
While Skylab was being built, other events significant to the 
future of space exploration were taking place. The initiatives bore the 
imprint of Thomas O. Paine, acting administrator after Webb's 
resignation in 1968 and administrator of NASA from March 1969 
until he returned to industry in September 1970. One was a broad 
approach to increased cooperation in space exploration. As had so 
many of our international space initiatives in the postwar period, 
this effort offered separate proposals to the Soviet Union and to 
Western European countries. The approach to the Soviet Union 
began in 1968, with suggestions for advanced cooperation, especially 
in the expensive arena of manned spaceflight. One area of Soviet 
vulnerability might be rescue of astronauts and cosmonauts. By now 
the Soviet Union had lost four cosmonauts in flight, three in one 
accident, one in another. They had always evidenced a singular 
concern for cosmonaut safety. Perhaps some joint program could 
develop a system of international space rescue. The dynamics 
seemed right; by 1969 the evidence was clear that, whether the Soviet 
Union had in fact been in a moon-landing race with the United 
States, the United States was ahead. Secrecy in space was virtually 
nonexistent; size of payloads, destinations of missions, perform-
ance-all were detectable by tracking systems. 
Paine's first offer was for Soviet linkup with the Skylab orbital 
workshop. But the very hardware implied inequity. The Soviets were 
not interested . Further explorations found lively Soviet interest in a 
completely new project to develop compatible docking and rescue 
systems for manned spaceflight. Negotiations proceeded rapidly. 
Completed by George M. Low, acting administrator after Paine's 
departure, the grand plan for the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project (ASTP) 
called for a mutual docking and crew exchange mission that could 
develop the necessary equipment for international rescue and 
establish such criteria for future manned systems from both nations. 
A Soyuz spacecraft would lift off from the Soviet Union and establish 
itself in orbit. Then an Apollo spacecraft would be launched to 
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rendezvous and dock with the Soviet craft. Using a specially 
developed docking unit between the two spacecraft, they would 
adjust pressurization differences of the two spacecraft and spend twO 
days docked together, exchanging crews and conducting experiments. 
All of this was agreed to and rapidly became a significant test for the 
validity of the detente agreements which President Richard M. 
Nixon had negotiated with the Soviet Union. 
An unprecedented detailed cooperation between the two super-
powers ensued. A series of joint working groups of Soviet and 
American specialists met over several years to work out the various 
hardware details and operational procedures. At the Nixon-Brezhnev 
summit in 1973, the prospective launch date was narrowed to July 
1975. The most concrete example of U.S.-USSR cooperation in 
space proceeded with good faith on both sides. The mission flew as 
scheduled on 15 July and smoothly fulfilled all objectives. 
The other major initiative of Paine's began on the domestic 
front and then expanded to the international front. Skylab having 
been narrowed to the point that it would be a limited answer to the 
future of manned spaceflight, President ixon appointed a task 
group to recommend broad outlines for the next 10 years of space 
L _ _ 
ASTP (Apollo-Soyuz Test Project) hardware on view at the Paris A irshow in May 197 J. 
The Apollo command and service modules are on the left, Soyuz on the right; the darker 
cylinder between them is the newly designed docking module. 
- -- ---~ 
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exploration . Within this group, chaired by Vice President Spiro T. 
Agnew, Paine won acceptance forthe conceprofthe Space Shuttle. In 
its original conception, the Space Shuttle would have been a rocket-
boosted airplane-like structure that would take off from a regular 
airport runway, fly to orbital speed and altitude, deploy satellites into 
orbit, repair or retrieve satellites already in orbit, and, using an 
additional Space Tug stage, lift manned and unmann d payloads 
throughout the solar system. Compared to earlier methods, the big 
changes would be that the launcher and Shuttle would be reusable 
for up to 100 flights, halving the cost per pound in orbit. But 
subsidiary changes were only slightly less important: satellites could 
be designed for orbital rigors, not the additional ones of rocket 
launch. In a manned mission, the Shuttle could handle up to a seven-
man crew in orbit; three of these could be non-pilot scientists who 
went along to operate their experiments in an unpressurized 
laboratory carried in the Shuttle cargo bay. The flight crew alone 
could deliver 29500 kilograms of assorted satellites into orbit and 
could land on Earth with a returning payload of 14500 kilograms. 
The task group submitted its repon to the president on 15 
September 1969. It offered three levels of effort: option I would 
feature a lunar-orbital station, an Earth-orbital station, and a lunar 
surface base in the 1980s; option 2 envisioned a Mars manned 
mission in 1986; option 3 included initial development of space 
station and reusable shuttles but would defer landing on Mars. until 
some time before the end of the century. Eventual peak expendi-
tures on these options were estimated to vary from $10 billion down 
to $5 billion per year. Study and rework went on for more than two 
years. Paine left NASA to return to industry; his successor, James C. 
Fletcher, took office in April 1971 and immediately reviewed the 
status of the Space Shuttle, particularly for its political salability. He 
became quickly convinced that the Shuttle as then envisioned was 
too costly to win approval. Total costs for its development were 
estimated at $10.5 billion. Fletcher instigated a rigorous restudy and 
redesign which cut the cost in half, mainly by dropping the plan for 
unassisted takeoff and substituting two external, recoverable, reusa-
ble solid rockets and an expendable external fuel tank. This proved 
to be salable; President Nixon approved the development of the 
Space Shuttle on 5 January 1972. 
First Paine and then Fletcher had been trying to get a commit-
ment for a major system in the Shuttle from Western European 
nations. Their own joint space program had not been an unqualified 
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success . Western European nations had joined to form two inter-
national space organizations, ELDO to produce launch vehicles and 
ESRO to produce spacecraft and collect and interpret results . The 
technical capability was there, but political liabilities constantly 
plagued and disrupted -who paid how much of what, which nations 
got which contracts, etc.? The boosters had three stages, each 
developed in a different country. The launch record was a gloomy 
history of one kind of failure after another. After years of effort, 
Western Europe had little to show for its independent space 
program. A new start was in the air. It was into this restive 
environment that Paine came to talk about the next generation of the 
U.S . space program and to hold out promise of some discrete major 
segment to be developed and produced in Europe-a partnership 
that would give them a meaningful piece of the action with full pride 
of useful participation. Europe's response was warm, though it took 
a while to coalesce. Finally the joint decision was made: Western 
Europe would build the self-contained Spacelab that would fit in the 
cargo bay of the Shuttle spacecraft; a pressurized module would pro-
vide a shirtsleeve environment for scientists to operate large-scale 
experiments; an unpressurized scientific instrument pallet would 
give large telescopes and other instruments direct access to the space 
environment. The cost, an estimated $370 million. In 1975 Canada 
joined the international effort, agreeing to foot the $30-million 
research and development bill for the remote manipulator that will 
be used to emplace and retrieve satellites in orbit. 
The Space Shuttle promised a whole new way of spaceflight: 
nonpilots in space; multiple payloads that could be placed where 
they were wanted or picked up out of orbit; new designs of satellites, 
free from the expensive safeguards against the vibrations and shocks 
of launch by rocket. The $5.2-billion program would buy two 
prototypes for test in 1978 and 1979. Projected flight programs from 
1980 to 1991 identified a total of almost a thousand payloads to be 
handled by the Shuttle. True space transportation was in the offing. 
In space science the big program was Viking, which represented 
the first major fruit of a decision NASA had made some years before: 
to focus the space science program on the planets. Apollo, the 
reasoning went, would keep scientists busy for years analyzing the 
mass of data and samples that had been returned from the moon. 
Not until that information had been assimilated would there be a 
need to consider whether more information was needed from the 
moon and, if so, what kind . 
Meanwhile space science, while not neglecting the study of the 
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sun and the universe, would concentrate on the inner planets of our 
solar system and begin an assault on the enigmatic outer planets. 
Apollo had shown, and the early planetary flights had confirmed, 
that every celestial body has worthwhile lessons to teach-lessons 
that are important in their own right as science as well as lessons that 
illuminate problems on Earth. Why does Earth have the kinds and 
proportions of minerals that it has? Why tectonic plates and 
volcanism? Why oceans and the kind of atmosphere it has ? Why does 
our atmosphere circulate and transfer heat the way it does? Every 
new body we study represents a new laboratory and a different data 
set. 
So it was that Mars, the most likely of the inner planets, became 
the first target of the more ambitious planetary program. In two 
launches the Viking program proposed to deploy four spacecraft in 
the vicinity of Mars; two orbiters would photograph the surface and 
serve as communications relays, while two landers would descend to 
the Martian surface and photograph the terrain, measure and 
monitor the atmosphere and climate, and conduct chemical and 
biological tests on the soil for evidence of rudimentary life forms. It 
was very ambitious technology and complex science to be operated 
from 65000000 kilometers distance. But perform Viking did, in a I 
technological triumph equal to-and in some ways greater than - . 
the Apollo landings on the moon. Arriving in the vicinity of Mars in 
mid-1976, the spacecraft went into orbit around the planet. Subse-
quently the two landers arced down to the rock-strewn surface where 
each landed safely. The twO orbiters circled the planet, mapping 
most of the surface. That surface depicted by the orbiters, plus the 
weather and seismic reports from the landers, told a story of a planet 
with a quiescent present but a very different, active past. Volcanoes 
half again as high as any on Earth and great eroded canyons deeper 
and longer than any on Earth spoke of times, probably three billion 
years ago, when Mars was very active volcan.ically, with widespread 
liquid flows. Trace gases in the present thin atmosphere indicate a 
much denser atmosphere in the past. There is water, frozen in the 
polar ice caps; there are occasional dust storms; there are seasonal as 
well as diurnal variations in temperature; there is only a trace of 
seismic activity now. Viking's elaborate biology instruments detected 
no evidence of life forms. When the intensive one-year study of the 
planet ended, the spacecraft continued observations and reporting at 
intervals, providing further data on surface features, climate, and 
weather. 
Earth's nearest planetary neighbor, Venus, was also probed 
Viking orbiter montage oj 102 pfwtos oj 
Mars in February 1980 (left) sfwws the 
Valles Marineris bisecting the planet, a 
gorge that would stretch from coast to coast 
of North America; to its left, three large 
volcanoes poke up through the unusual 
cloud cover. Below, Viking Lander 1 
views its surroundings after landing injuly 
1976. The horizon is about three kilometers 
distant. From the left toward the middle, 
wind-blown materials have formed low 
dunes. The larger oJthe two boulders in the 
center is eight meters from the spacecraft 
and three meters in diameter. 
during the last half of the 1970s. Two Pioneer spacecraft were 
launched toward Venus in the summer of 1978. Studying Venus 
presents a notably different problem than Mars or Earth. Its thick, 
heavy, hot atmosphere is impervious to normal photography and 
can be "seen" through only by means of radar. The first spacecraft 
arriving at Venus in December 1978, therefore, was an orbiter 
equipped with mapping radar to delineate the major features on the 
surface. The second spacecraft was a bus which released four probes 
in a broad pattern; these parachuted slowly through the atmosphere, 
sending back measurements until they crashed. The Venusian 
atmosphere, they reported, is remarkably similar in composition 
and temperature on the day and night sides. There is a heavy sulfur 
content, with oxygen and water vapor at lower levels. By 1980 the 
orbiter had mapped over 80% of the Venusian surface. Major 
features resemble two continents and a massive island chain-except 
there is no ocean. Instead a rolling plain envelops the planet. One 
continent and the island chain are in the northern hemisphere. The 
continent is the size of Australia and has mountains taller than 
Everest; the island chain is apparently composed of two massive 
shield volcanoes more extensive than the Hawaii-Midway complex. 
The continent in the southern hemisphere is about half the size of 
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Africa and exposes the lowest elevations on Venus in the Great Rift 
Valley, a huge trench 280 kilometers wide and 2250 long, with a 
depth similar to that of the great rift on Mars. 
Study of the outer planets using more sophisticated spacecraft 
began in 1977 with the launch of Voyager 1 and 2 on 18-month flights 
to Jupiter. The Voyager system, Science magazine reported, was 
improved "by a factor of 150,000 times" over the Mariner 4 system, 
which flew to Mars in 1965. Voyager 1 made its closest approach to 
Jupiter in March 1979, with Voyager 2 following in July. The sensors 
recorded in fine-grain detail the intricate weather patterns on 
Jupiter and detected massive lightning bolts in the cloud tops. Passes 
by the Galilean moons revealed startling differences: active volcanoes 
on 10, ancient rings on Callisto marking the edges of huge impact 
craters, Europa's surface laced with cracks from crustal movement, 
and Ganymede with a varying grooved and cratered surface. 
With a boost from Jupiter's gravitational field, the Voyagers set 
course for distant, beringed Saturn, where Voyager 1 arrived in 
November 1980. Voyager 2 was scheduled to arrive in August 1981, 
after which, if sufficient control gas remains, the mission may be 
extended to far-away Uranus. The venerable Pioneer 11 had visited 
Saturn in September 1979, discovering faint rings outside those 
discernible from Earth and demonstrating a safe flight path for 
Voyager 2 to follow, if it goes on to Uranus. . 
In the study of the sun and its interrelationships with Earth, 
NASA continued analysis of the mass of data acquired by Skylab's 
Apollo telescope mount. OSO 8, launched in 1975 to make a detailed 
study of the minimum phase of the II-year solar cycle, returned data 
until 1978. HeLios 2, part of ajoint program with the Federal Republic 
of Germany to study the basic solar processes, was launched in 1976. 
As the solar cycle moved toward its maximum phase, the Solar 
Maximum Mission was launched in 1980 to study solar flares in the 
wavelengths in which the sun releases most of its energy. 
To study the effects of solar radiation on Earth 's magnetosphere 
and atmosphere, NASA launched InternationaL Sun-Earth ExpLorer 1 
and 2 in 1977. Positioned some distance apart but in similar elliptical 
orbits, the two satellites (one provided by NASA, the other by the 
European Space Agency) monitored the complex interactions of 
Earth's magnetosphere with incoming solar radiation. In 1978 ISEE 
3 was added to the system. Positioned much farther out from Earth, 
the spacecraft receives the solar wind and flares about an hour 
earlier, when they are unaffected by the magnetosphere. 
Voyager I and 2 photographs of jupiter and its moon 10. Above, the violent weather 
patterns that constantly swirl around the edges oj the Great Red Spot, the huge storm 
larger than Earth. Below, the vivid surface oj 10, punctured with volcanoes and stained 
with their flow. 
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In study of the universe, the major program of the second half of 
the 1970s was the series of three high-energy astronomy observatories. 
HEAO I, launched in 1977 and the heaviest scientific satellite to date, 
surveyed the sky for x-ray sources, identifying several hundred new 
ones. HEAO 2, following the next year, studied in detail the most 
promising of those sources. HEAO 3, launched in 1979, surveyed the 
sky for gamma-ray sources and cosmic-ray flux. The other satellite 
orbited for study of the universe was the International Ultraviolet 
Explorer. Carrying instruments from NASA, the United Kingdom, 
and the European Space Agency, IUE recorded ultraviolet emissions 
using two ground control centers from which the experimenters 
could direct the observations of the satellite much as is done with 
telescopes in observatories on Earth. 
An intensified activity for NASA in the latter half of the 1970s 
was the congressionally mandated study of Earth's upper atmosphere, 
to learn more about the effects of gases such as freon on the ozone 
layer. A continuous measuring program resulted; several agencies 
provided data from which a detailed model of the complex processes 
could be constructed. 
The space applications program was active in the late 1970s. 
Communications research continued with the launch in 1976 of 
Communications Technology Satellite I. A joint project with Canada, CTS 
I investigated the possibilities of high-powered satellites transmitting 
public service information to small, inexpensive antennas in remote 
locations. 
Landsat 3 was launched in 1978, providing continuity for the 
flow of data to a growing number of users of Earth-resources 
information. The most ambitious new Earth-resources program was 
in agriculture. Encouraged by the results of the experimental Large 
Area Crop Inventory Experiment that ended in 1978 after demon-
strating 90% accuracy in predicting the wheat production in the U.S. 
Southern Great Plains and USSR, the Department of Agriculture, 
with technical assistance from NASA and NOAA, began AgRISTARS 
(Agriculture and Resources Inventory Surveys Through Aerospace 
Remote Sensing). 
A new form of resources surveying was attempted in 1978 with 
the launch of Seasat I. Intended to report on such variables as sea 
temperature, wave heights, surface-wind speeds and direction, sea 
ice, and storms, Seasat I was an instant success. Unfortunately its life 
was cut short after three months in orbit by electrical power failure. 
Enough data had been recorded, however, to verify the effectiveness 
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of the instrumentation and the existence of a group of potential users 
in the weather, maritime, and fisheries communities. 
In environmental research, NASA launched Nimbus 7 in 1978, 
the last of the series oflarge, experimental weather satellites. One of 
its instruments, together with one on Nimbus 4 and the observations 
of SAGE (Stratospheric Aerosol and Gas Experiment, launched in 
1979), provided a profile and model of the ozone layer. The nation's 
weather satellite system was augmented in 1978 by the launch of 
Tiros-N and NOAA 6, the first two of a new generation of improved 
weather satellites in near-polar orbit. Tiros-N was a principal U.S 
contributor to the international Global Atmospheric Research 
Program. 
In geophysical research, a small experimental Heat Capacity 
Mapping Mission satellite was launched in 1978 to derive day and night 
temperatures of rock formations as a possible means of locating 
mineral-bearing strata. In 1979 another small satellite, Magsat, went 
into low orbit to take finer scale readings of anomalies in Earth's 
magnetic field that are directly related to crustal structure and 
therefore to possible mineral deposits. In earthquake research 
NASA completed in 1979 the fourth phase of data gathering along 
the San Andreas Fault in California. By means of satellite ranging 
from specified points along both sides of the fault, experimenters 
estimated that the tectonic plates were moving 6 to 12 centimeters 
per year. 
The largest consumer of the NASA budget and of management 
attention during the late 1970s was the Space Shuttle. Since its 
beginnings in the early 1970s, the development story for the Space 
Shuttle had been quite different from that of Apollo in the 1960s. The 
original projected costs had been halved to win the necessary 
political approval of the program; this cut was only achieved by 
making severe compromises in the original design-from a system 
that would take off from a runway like an airplane, fly into orbit, and 
return to land on a·runway like an airplane, to a system that would 
take off vertically like a rocket, jettison the boosters and fuel tanks, 
and return to land on a runway like an airplane. This initial 
compromise was not to be the last, as the budget continued to Qe lean 
year after year. Potential development problems were worked 
around because the money was not available to investigate them. The 
consequences of this insufficient level of research during the 
development cycle were not apparent in the years when the Shuttle 
was bei·ng designed and the components fabricated. As late as 1977, 
-- -~- --- -- - - -- - - - - - -
A HISTORY OF ACA AND A A, 1915- 1980 95 
when the orbiter Enterprise was carried to altitude by .J)/i !d 
dropped to make approach and landing flights at Dryden Flight 
Research Center, progress was seen to be sure, if a little slow. 
By 1978 it became obvious that serious problems were dogging 
the main engines. A cluster of three of these high-pressure liquid-
hydrogen-fueled engines would propel the orbiter into orbit, aided 
by twO solid-rocket boosters . ot only were the main engines 
expected to produce the highest specific impulse of any rocket 
engine yet flown, but they also had to be throttleable and reusable-
to fire again and again for many flights before being replaced. When 
by 1979 a series of painstaking component-by-component analyses 
had identified and fixed most of the problems and individual 
engines were experiencing better test runs, the first firings of the 
clustered engines generated a new set of problems . Grudgingly these 
too yielded to concentrated engineering rework; by the end of 1980 
the total requirement of 80000 seconds of test firing was at hand. 
The other pacing item on the orbiter was the thermal protection 
tiling that would shield most of the orbiter surface from the searing 
heat of reentry. Manufacture and application of the 33 000 tiles 
lagged so badly that early in 1979 NASA decided to ferry the orbiter 
from the manufacturer's plant in California to Kennedy Space 
Center so that the remainder of the tiles could be applied there while 
other work and system checks were being done. But problems 
continued. The tiles were brittle and easily damaged; they did not 
bond to the metal properly and thousands had to be reapplied; they 
were too fragile and more thousands had to be removed, made more 
dense, and reapplied. Between the tiles and the engines, the Space 
Shuttle budget overran for several years and the date for the first 
flight slipped two painful years, with serious consequences for many 
government, domestic, and international customers. By the end of 
1980, however, first flight in the spring of 1981 seemed truly 
possible. Operational flights were solidly booked out to the middle 
of the 1980s and the other three orbiters were moving through 
manufacturing. 
NASA's advanced research examined a range of improvements 
for space, energy, and aeronautical systems. Research on space 
systems included new kinds of thermal coatings for portions of the 
Space Shuttle orbiter, lighter weight and more heat-resistant structural 
components made from composite materials for use in spacecraft, a 
charge-coupled sensor for exploring the near-infrared portion of the 
spectrum, a small liquid-oxygen-fueled engine for orbital transfer, 
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The Space Shuttle had its successes and problems. Above, the orbiter Enterprise is 
touching down at Dryden Flight Research Center in October 1977 as it nears the end oj 
its successful descent and landing tests. Below, in July 1980 some 8000 thermal 
protection tiles were still to be installed on the orbiter. 
ion thrusters for long-distance spaceflight or station keeping, and 
solar cells five times lighter and thinner than previous ones. 
The late 1970s witnessed a substantial increase in energy 
research in NASA as the nation reacted to the oil shortages of 1973 
and 1978. Mosdy funded by the Department of Energy, the research 
has employed many of NASA's traditional skills: in propulsion, 
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development of automotive and industrial gas turbines; in energy 
generation, development of improved and cheaper solar cells, long-
life fu el celis, and large, more efficient wind turbines. 
In aeronautical research, the focus in these years was on making 
aircraft more efficient in use of energy, making engines quieter, and 
reducing poliution. One approach to energy conservation was 
reduction of aircraft weight through the use of composite materials 
in structural components. Another was in systematic improvement 
of engine components for better fuel and emission performance and 
for durability. Another was improved aerodynamic performance, 
first with the supercritical wing and then with the oblique wing, 
which by altering its angle of attack vis-a.-vis the fuselage could tailor 
lift to speed; use of winglets, which promise a 6-8% reduction in 
drag; slotted panels on the wings to restore laminar flow of air over 
the wing, thereby reducing drag. Emission control was improved by 
25-30% for large turbine engines in 1976-1977 and extended to 
small turbines in 1978 and 1979. 
LOO KING AHEAD 
NASA budgets of the late 1970s permitted few new starts . By 
1979, for example, launches for NASA's own program-as opposed 
to those NASA launched for others-were down to three, by 1980 to 
one. The planetary missions that were the most exciting part of the 
space program in the last half of the 1970s have been reduced to one 
mission in the first half of the 1980s: Calileo will send an orbiter and 
an atmospheric probe to Jupiter, beginning in 1984. In space 
astronomy, the Space Telescope is the central mission. In orbit, it will 
extend man's vision almost to the edge of the universe, exceeding the 
capability of the best ground-based telescope by seven times the 
distance that can be penetrated and by 50 times the faintness of 
objects that can be detected. In solar physics, the International Solar 
Polar Mission, to launch in 1983, will use the gravity assist of Jupiter to 
approach the sun out of the ecliptic plane and view directly its polar 
areas. In applications, Landsat D, equipped with new-generation 
sensors, is to be launched in 1982. 
Of all programs coming into flight status in the first half of the 
1980s, the most promising in possibilities for innovation and 
unforeseen opportunities is the Space Shuttle. Designed to be a 
"space truck" that places into orbit all United States satellites as well 
as corporate and international satellites, designed to operate with the 
Spacelab that offers scientists shirtsleeve-comfort access to the space 
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environment, the Space Shuttle will much enlarge the possibilities of 
exploitation of the space environment. From its first few flights, it 
should unveil other aptitudes and unexpected potential, challenging 
the human imagination to continue to explore the largest laboratory 
man will ever have-the universe. 
RETROSPECT 
Where has NASA taken us? From the thin ribbon of Earth's 
atmosphere out to the edge of the solar system in two decades. The 
moon, Mars, Venus, Jupiter, Mercury, Saturn being explored. 
Pulsars, quasars, black holes, all stunning clues to the life cycle of the 
universe. Solar flares, the corona, the internal structure of the sun, all 
of which have illuminated research to harness fusion energy on 
Earth. Quiet aircraft engines, the supercritical wing, economies in 
fuel consumption in aircraft. Vast improvements in worldwide 
communications, weather prediction, crop inventories, in knowledge 
of oceanic ice movements, offish migrations, or urban development, 
of broad patterns of geological formations relating to earthquakes 
and mineral deposits. An expanded industrial and university capabil-
ity for high-caliber research and development, for ultraprecision, 
high-performance workmanship. Thousands of new products in the 
commercial marketplace. These were some of the more immediate 
returns from the $79-billion investment this nation had made in civil 
aeronautics and space research through 1980. 
Beyond these immediate returns, which are most noteworthy of 
the less tangible but nonetheless real returns on investment? The 
international space program, with more than 80 nations involved in 
mutually beneficial space projects? The joint Soviet-American 
manned spaceflight, which straightened at least momentarily the 
tortuous path of superpower competition by its irrefutable need for, 
and achievement of, significant cooperation? The longer term 
import of new insights from space sciences on origins of our 
spacecraft Earth, its mineral and energy resources, the fragility of its 
thin atmospheric envelope? 
And beyond the present and near future, what of the historical 
lessons? Where else in the 20th-century history of our nation is more 
clearly encapsulated our dangerous national trait of international 
roulette, of a deep-seated complacency that can be penetrated only 
by extreme challenge: World War I and the too-late founding of 
NACA; World War II and the belated threefold expansion ofNACA; 
'the Cold War and scrambling from behind to NASA and Apollo? 
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The course of history tells us that new truths, once exposed, defy 
turning back the clock. The door to aeronautics and space has been 
opened. It can no more be slammed shut than could the door 
opened by Gutenberg's printing press or by gunpowder; by Galileo's 
telescope or by the steam engine; by Pasteur's discovery of germs or 
by the unleashing of nuclear energy. History impartially muses: who 
will have the vision and steadfastness of purpose to make the most of 
this newly opened door? 
Finally, what of long-term questions ? Will peaceful space 
competition prove to be a constructive alternative to war on Earth? 
Will space colonization be the eventual answer to overpopulation 
and depletion of the fragile planet Earth? Are there super-civilizations 
somewhere in the universe that can teach Earthlings how to resolve 
their self-centered conflicts? 
At this stage in our excursion into the vastness of space, it is of 
course too early to venture answers. We are presumptuous even to 
formulate questions. In all humility, only one finding is certain: our 
first faltering steps into space have reaped incalculable, unforeseen 
rewards. Future possibilities are as limitless as man's enterprise 
chooses to venture. 
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